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Niall Hughes

Personal Details

First Name:Niall
Middle Name:E
Last Name:Hughes
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:phu428
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
http://niallehughes.com
King's Business School, King's College London, Bush House, 30 Aldwych, London WC2B 4BG
Terminal Degree:2013 Department of Economics; European University Institute (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

Business School
King's College London

London, United Kingdom
http://www.kcl.ac.uk/business
RePEc:edi:dmkcluk (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Hughes, Niall, 2020. "Strategic Voting in Two-Party Legislative Elections," MPRA Paper 100363, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. Fehrler, Sebastian & Hughes, Niall, 2015. "How Transparency Kills Information Aggregation: theory and Experiment," Economic Research Papers 270006, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
  3. Hughes, Niall, 2015. "Voting in Legislative Elections Under Plurality Rule," Economic Research Papers 269728, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
  4. Fehrler, Sebastian & Hughes, Niall, 2014. "How Transparency Kills Information Aggregation (And Why That May Be A Good Thing)," VfS Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100440, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.

Articles

  1. Sebastian Fehrler & Niall Hughes, 2018. "How Transparency Kills Information Aggregation: Theory and Experiment," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 10(1), pages 181-209, February.
  2. Hughes, Niall, 2016. "Voting in legislative elections under plurality rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 51-93.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Hughes, Niall, 2020. "Strategic Voting in Two-Party Legislative Elections," MPRA Paper 100363, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    Cited by:

    1. Björn Kauder & Niklas Potrafke, 2022. "Rewarding conservative politicians? Evidence from voting on same-sex marriage," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 191(1), pages 161-172, April.

  2. Fehrler, Sebastian & Hughes, Niall, 2015. "How Transparency Kills Information Aggregation: theory and Experiment," Economic Research Papers 270006, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Yongping Bao & Ludwig Danwitz & Fabian Dvorak & Sebastian Fehrler & Lars Hornuf & Hsuan Yu Lin & Bettina von Helversen, 2022. "Similarity and Consistency in Algorithm-Guided Exploration," CESifo Working Paper Series 10188, CESifo.
    2. Laurent Bouton & Aniol Llorente-Saguer & Frédéric Malherbe, 2016. "Unanimous Rules in the Laboratory," NBER Working Papers 21943, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Quement, Mark T. Le & Marcin, Isabel, 2020. "Communication and voting in heterogeneous committees: An experimental study," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 174(C), pages 449-468.
    4. S. Nageeb Ali & Roland Bénabou, 2020. "Image versus Information: Changing Societal Norms and Optimal Privacy," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 12(3), pages 116-164, August.
    5. Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay & Moumita Deb & Johannes Lohse & Rebecca McDonald, 2024. "The swing voter's curse revisited: Transparency's impact on committee voting," Discussion Papers 24-01, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
    6. Fang, Ximeng & Ho, Chui Yee, 2024. "The effect of transparency on subjective evaluations: Evidence from competitive figure skating," VfS Annual Conference 2024 (Berlin): Upcoming Labor Market Challenges 302427, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    7. Fehrler, Sebastian & Hahn, Volker, 2020. "Committee Decision-Making under the Threat of Leaks," IZA Discussion Papers 13746, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    8. Midjord, Rune & Rodríguez Barraquer, Tomás & Valasek, Justin, 2021. "When voters like to be right: An analysis of the Condorcet Jury Theorem with mixed motives," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).
    9. Lydia Mechtenberg & Jean-Robert Tyran, 2016. "Voter Motivation and the Quality of Democratic Choice," Discussion Papers 16-13, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
    10. Rieder, Kilian, 2022. "Monetary policy decision-making by committee: Why, when and how it can work," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
    11. Mattozzi, Andrea & Nakaguma, Marcos Y., 2022. "Public versus Secret Voting in Committees," CEPR Discussion Papers 17336, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    12. Bandyopadhyay, Siddhartha & Deb, Moumita & Lohse, Johannes & McDonald, Rebecca, 2024. "The Swing Voter’s Curse Revisited: Transparency’s Impact on Committee Voting," Working Papers 0744, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
    13. Fehrler, Sebastian & Janas, Moritz, 2021. "Delegation to a Group," IZA Discussion Papers 14426, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    14. Swank, Otto H. & Visser, Bauke, 2023. "Committees as active audiences: Reputation concerns and information acquisition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 221(C).
    15. Name-Correa, Alvaro J. & Yildirim, Huseyin, 2019. "Social pressure, transparency, and voting in committees," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 184(C).
    16. Riboni, Alessandro & Ruge-Murcia, Francisco, 2019. "Mind-changes at the FOMC," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 184(C).
    17. Feddersen, Timothy & Gradwohl, Ronen, 2020. "Decentralized advice," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    18. Sebastian Fehrler & Baiba Renerte & Irenaeus Wolff, 2020. "Beliefs about Others: A Striking Example of Information Neglect," TWI Research Paper Series 118, Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz.
    19. Clement Minaudier, 2022. "The Value of Confidential Policy Information: Persuasion, Transparency, and Influence," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 38(2), pages 570-612.
    20. Alessandro RIBONI & Francisco RUGE-MURCIA, 2018. "Deliberation in Committees : Theory and Evidence from the FOMC," Cahiers de recherche 01-2018, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
    21. Catonini, Emiliano & Kurbatov, Andrey & Stepanov, Sergey, 2024. "Independent versus collective expertise," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 143(C), pages 340-356.
    22. Herrera, Helios & Llorente-Saguer, Aniol & McMurray, Joseph C., 2019. "Information aggregation and turnout in proportional representation: A laboratory experiment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 179(C).
    23. Breitmoser, Yves & Valasek, Justin, 2017. "A rationale for unanimity in committees," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Economics of Change SP II 2017-308, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    24. Ronen Gradwohl, 2018. "Voting in the limelight," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 66(1), pages 65-103, July.
    25. Matthias Lang & Simeon Schudy, 2023. "(Dis)honesty and the Value of Transparency for Campaign Promises," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 409, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    26. Brigitte Desroches & Sharon Kozicki & Laure Simon, 2024. "Monetary Policy Governance: Bank of Canada Practices to Support Policy Effectiveness," Discussion Papers 2024-14, Bank of Canada.
    27. Debrah Meloso & Salvatore Nunnari & Marco Ottaviani, 2023. "Looking into Crystal Balls: A Laboratory Experiment on Reputational Cheap Talk," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(9), pages 5112-5127, September.
    28. Yuan Liu & Hongmin Chen, 2022. "Cheap‐talk advertising, product experience, and reputation concern," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 43(7), pages 3165-3175, October.
    29. Kawamura, Kohei & Vlaseros, Vasileios, 2017. "Expert information and majority decisions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 147(C), pages 77-88.
    30. Keiichi Morimoto, 2021. "Information Use and the Condorcet Jury Theorem," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 9(10), pages 1-22, May.
    31. Mayskaya, Tatiana & Nikandrova, Arina, 2023. "The dark side of transparency: When hiding in plain sight works," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).
    32. Daniel Gibbs, 2023. "Individual accountability, collective decision-making," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 34(4), pages 524-552, December.
    33. De Moragas, Antoni-Italo, 2022. "Disclosing decision makers’ private interests," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 150(C).

  3. Hughes, Niall, 2015. "Voting in Legislative Elections Under Plurality Rule," Economic Research Papers 269728, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Hans Gersbach & Akaki Mamageishvili & Oriol Tejada, 2017. "Assessment Voting in Large Electorates," Papers 1712.05470, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2018.
    2. Gersbach, Hans & Mamageishvili, Akaki & Tejada, Oriol, 2021. "The effect of handicaps on turnout for large electorates with an application to assessment voting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 195(C).
    3. Francesco De Sinopoli & Claudia Meroni & Carlos Pimienta, 2014. "Strategic Stability in Poisson Games," Discussion Papers 2014-09, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
    4. Gersbach, Hans & Mamageishvili, Akaki & Tejada, Oriol, 2019. "The Effect of Handicaps on Turnout for Large Electorates: An Application to Assessment Voting," CEPR Discussion Papers 13921, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Francesco Sinopoli & Christopher Künstler & Claudia Meroni & Carlos Pimienta, 2023. "Poisson–Cournot games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 75(3), pages 803-840, April.
      • Francesco De Sinopoli & Christopher Kunstler & Claudia Meroni & Carlos Pimienta, 2020. "Poisson-Cournot Games," Discussion Papers 2020-07, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
    6. Mamageishvili, Akaki & Tejada, Oriol, 2023. "Large elections and interim turnout," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 175-210.
    7. Hughes, Niall, 2020. "Strategic Voting in Two-Party Legislative Elections," MPRA Paper 100363, University Library of Munich, Germany.

  4. Fehrler, Sebastian & Hughes, Niall, 2014. "How Transparency Kills Information Aggregation (And Why That May Be A Good Thing)," VfS Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100440, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.

    Cited by:

    1. Laurent Bouton & Aniol Llorente-Saguer & Frédéric Malherbe, 2016. "Unanimous Rules in the Laboratory," NBER Working Papers 21943, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. S. Nageeb Ali & Roland Bénabou, 2020. "Image versus Information: Changing Societal Norms and Optimal Privacy," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 12(3), pages 116-164, August.
    3. Lydia Mechtenberg & Jean-Robert Tyran, 2016. "Voter Motivation and the Quality of Democratic Choice," Discussion Papers 16-13, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
    4. Alessandro RIBONI & Francisco RUGE-MURCIA, 2018. "Deliberation in Committees : Theory and Evidence from the FOMC," Cahiers de recherche 01-2018, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
    5. Herrera, Helios & Llorente-Saguer, Aniol & McMurray, Joseph C., 2019. "Information aggregation and turnout in proportional representation: A laboratory experiment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 179(C).
    6. Breitmoser, Yves & Valasek, Justin, 2017. "A rationale for unanimity in committees," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Economics of Change SP II 2017-308, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    7. Ronen Gradwohl, 2018. "Voting in the limelight," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 66(1), pages 65-103, July.
    8. Kawamura, Kohei & Vlaseros, Vasileios, 2017. "Expert information and majority decisions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 147(C), pages 77-88.

Articles

  1. Sebastian Fehrler & Niall Hughes, 2018. "How Transparency Kills Information Aggregation: Theory and Experiment," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 10(1), pages 181-209, February.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  2. Hughes, Niall, 2016. "Voting in legislative elections under plurality rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 51-93.
    See citations under working paper version above.Sorry, no citations of articles recorded.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

Access and download statistics for all items

Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 9 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (8) 2014-12-24 2015-02-16 2015-05-16 2015-12-08 2015-12-08 2016-01-18 2016-01-18 2020-06-08. Author is listed
  2. NEP-EXP: Experimental Economics (5) 2015-02-16 2015-02-16 2015-05-16 2015-12-08 2016-01-18. Author is listed
  3. NEP-POL: Positive Political Economics (4) 2014-12-24 2015-12-08 2016-01-18 2020-06-08
  4. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (2) 2015-05-16 2020-06-08
  5. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory and Applications (1) 2015-05-16
  6. NEP-DES: Economic Design (1) 2020-06-08
  7. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (1) 2014-12-24
  8. NEP-NET: Network Economics (1) 2016-01-18

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