Yves Guéron
(Yves Gueron)
Personal Details
First Name: | Yves |
Middle Name: | |
Last Name: | Gueron |
Suffix: | |
RePEc Short-ID: | pgu492 |
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public] | |
https://sites.google.com/view/gueron/ | |
Terminal Degree: | 2013 Department of Economics; University College London (UCL) (from RePEc Genealogy) |
Affiliation
Division of Economics
Seoul National University
Seoul, South Koreahttp://econ.snu.ac.kr/
RePEc:edi:desnukr (more details at EDIRC)
Research output
Jump to: ArticlesArticles
- Eungik Lee & Andrew Choi & Syngjoo Choi & Yves Guéron, 2023.
"Irreversibility And Monitoring In Dynamic Games: Experimental Evidence,"
International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 64(1), pages 387-412, February.
- Andrew Choi & Syngjoo Choi & Yves Gueron & Eungik Lee, 2020. "Irreversibility and Monitoring in Dynamic Games: Experimental Evidence," Working Paper Series no133, Institute of Economic Research, Seoul National University.
- Yves Guéron & Jihong Lee, 2022. "Learning by Selling, Knowledge Spillovers, and Patents," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 70(4), pages 867-912, December.
- Yves Guéron, 2019. "Repeated Games with Asymptotically Finite Horizon and Imperfect Public Monitoring," Korean Economic Review, Korean Economic Association, vol. 35, pages 109-123.
- Guéron, Yves, 2015. "Failure of gradualism under imperfect monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 128-145.
- Guéron, Yves & Lamadon, Thibaut & Thomas, Caroline D., 2011. "On the folk theorem with one-dimensional payoffs and different discount factors," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 287-295, September.
Citations
Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.Articles
- Guéron, Yves, 2015.
"Failure of gradualism under imperfect monitoring,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 128-145.
Cited by:
- Andrew Choi & Syngjoo Choi & Yves Gueron & Eungik Lee, 2020.
"Irreversibility and Monitoring in Dynamic Games: Experimental Evidence,"
Working Paper Series
no133, Institute of Economic Research, Seoul National University.
- Eungik Lee & Andrew Choi & Syngjoo Choi & Yves Guéron, 2023. "Irreversibility And Monitoring In Dynamic Games: Experimental Evidence," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 64(1), pages 387-412, February.
- Chen, Yi, 2020. "A revision game of experimentation on a common threshold," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 186(C).
- Andrew Choi & Syngjoo Choi & Yves Gueron & Eungik Lee, 2020.
"Irreversibility and Monitoring in Dynamic Games: Experimental Evidence,"
Working Paper Series
no133, Institute of Economic Research, Seoul National University.
- Guéron, Yves & Lamadon, Thibaut & Thomas, Caroline D., 2011.
"On the folk theorem with one-dimensional payoffs and different discount factors,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 287-295, September.
Cited by:
- Carmona, Guilherme & Carvalho, Luís, 2016. "Repeated two-person zero-sum games with unequal discounting and private monitoring," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 131-138.
- Daniel Cardona & Antoni Rubí-Barceló, 2016. "Time-Preference Heterogeneity and Multiplicity of Equilibria in Two-Group Bargaining," Games, MDPI, vol. 7(2), pages 1-17, May.
- Kimmo Berg, 2017. "Extremal Pure Strategies and Monotonicity in Repeated Games," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 49(3), pages 387-404, March.
- Marina Agranov & Jeongbin Kim & Leeat Yariv, 2023. "Coordination with Differential Time Preferences: Experimental Evidence," Working Papers 2023-10, Princeton University. Economics Department..
- ,, 2015. "Characterizing the limit set of PPE payoffs with unequal discounting," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(3), September.
- Marina Agranov & Jeongbin Kim & Leeat Yariv, 2023. "Coordination with Differential Time Preferences: Experimental Evidence," CESifo Working Paper Series 10454, CESifo.
- Aramendia, Miguel & Wen, Quan, 2020. "Myopic perception in repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 1-14.
- Chen, Bo & Takahashi, Satoru, 2012. "A folk theorem for repeated games with unequal discounting," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 571-581.
- Dasgupta, Ani & Ghosh, Sambuddha, 2022. "Self-accessibility and repeated games with asymmetric discounting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 200(C).
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