Hayrullah Dindar
Personal Details
First Name: | Hayrullah |
Middle Name: | |
Last Name: | Dindar |
Suffix: | |
RePEc Short-ID: | pdi391 |
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public] | |
https://sites.google.com/site/hayrullah/ | |
Twitter: | @hayrullahdindar |
Affiliation
(99%) TU Berlin, Institute of Software Engineering and Theoretical Computer Science, Efficient Algorithms
https://www.algo.tu-berlin.de/menue/efficient_algorithms_algo/Berlin, Germany
(1%) Murat Sertel İleri İktisadi Araştırmalar Merkezi
İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi
İstanbul, Turkeyhttp://mscenter.bilgi.edu.tr/
RePEc:edi:msbiltr (more details at EDIRC)
Research output
Jump to: Working papers ArticlesWorking papers
- Hayrullah Dindar & Jean Lainé, 2023.
"Vote swapping in irresolute two-tier voting procedures,"
Post-Print
hal-03958175, HAL.
- Hayrullah Dindar & Jean Lainé, 2023. "Vote swapping in irresolute two-tier voting procedures," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 61(2), pages 221-262, August.
- Hayrullah Dindar & Jean Lainé, 2022.
"Compromise in combinatorial vote,"
Post-Print
hal-03576075, HAL.
- Hayrullah Dindar & Jean Lainé, 2022. "Compromise in combinatorial vote," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 59(1), pages 175-206, July.
- Fatma Aslan & Hayrullah Dindar & Jean Lainé, 2021.
"When are committees of Condorcet winners Condorcet winning committees?,"
Post-Print
hal-03335584, HAL.
- Fatma Aslan & Hayrullah Dindar & Jean Lainé, 2022. "When are committees of Condorcet winners Condorcet winning committees?," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 26(3), pages 417-446, September.
- Fatma Aslan & Hayrullah Dindar & Jean Lainé, 2021.
"Correction to: When are committees of Condorcet winners Condorcet winning committees?,"
Post-Print
hal-03851366, HAL.
- Fatma Aslan & Hayrullah Dindar & Jean Lainé, 2023. "Correction to: When are committees of Condorcet winners Condorcet winning committees?," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 27(2), pages 469-469, June.
- Hayrullah Dindar & Gilbert Laffond & Jean Lainé, 2021.
"Referendum Paradox for Party-List Proportional Representation,"
Post-Print
hal-03335595, HAL.
- Hayrullah Dindar & Gilbert Laffond & Jean Lainé, 2021. "Referendum Paradox for Party-List Proportional Representation," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 30(1), pages 191-220, February.
- Fatma Aslan & Hayrullah Dindar & Jean Lainé, 2019. "Choosing a Committee Under Majority Voting," Post-Print hal-03271214, HAL.
- Hayrullah Dindar & Jean Lainé, 2017.
"Manipulation of single-winner large elections by vote pairing,"
Post-Print
hal-03271191, HAL.
- Dindar, Hayrullah & Lainé, Jean, 2017. "Manipulation of single-winner large elections by vote pairing," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 161(C), pages 105-107.
- Hayrullah Dindar & Gilbert Laffond & Jean Lainé, 2017.
"The strong referendum paradox,"
Post-Print
hal-03271187, HAL.
- Hayrullah Dindar & Gilbert Laffond & Jean Laine, 2017. "The strong referendum paradox," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 51(4), pages 1707-1731, July.
- Hayrullah Dindar & Gilbert Laffond & Jean Lainé, 2015. "Vote Swapping in Representative Democracy," Post-Print hal-03271247, HAL.
- Hayrullah Dindar & Gilbert Laffond & Jean Laine, 2013. "Seperable Voting Rules and the Strong Referandum Paradox," Working Papers 201302, Murat Sertel Center for Advanced Economic Studies, Istanbul Bilgi University.
Articles
- Hayrullah Dindar & Jean Lainé, 2023.
"Vote swapping in irresolute two-tier voting procedures,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 61(2), pages 221-262, August.
- Hayrullah Dindar & Jean Lainé, 2023. "Vote swapping in irresolute two-tier voting procedures," Post-Print hal-03958175, HAL.
- Fatma Aslan & Hayrullah Dindar & Jean Lainé, 2023.
"Correction to: When are committees of Condorcet winners Condorcet winning committees?,"
Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 27(2), pages 469-469, June.
- Fatma Aslan & Hayrullah Dindar & Jean Lainé, 2021. "Correction to: When are committees of Condorcet winners Condorcet winning committees?," Post-Print hal-03851366, HAL.
- Hayrullah Dindar & Jean Lainé, 2022.
"Compromise in combinatorial vote,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 59(1), pages 175-206, July.
- Hayrullah Dindar & Jean Lainé, 2022. "Compromise in combinatorial vote," Post-Print hal-03576075, HAL.
- Fatma Aslan & Hayrullah Dindar & Jean Lainé, 2022.
"When are committees of Condorcet winners Condorcet winning committees?,"
Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 26(3), pages 417-446, September.
- Fatma Aslan & Hayrullah Dindar & Jean Lainé, 2021. "When are committees of Condorcet winners Condorcet winning committees?," Post-Print hal-03335584, HAL.
- Hayrullah Dindar & Gilbert Laffond & Jean Lainé, 2021.
"Referendum Paradox for Party-List Proportional Representation,"
Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 30(1), pages 191-220, February.
- Hayrullah Dindar & Gilbert Laffond & Jean Lainé, 2021. "Referendum Paradox for Party-List Proportional Representation," Post-Print hal-03335595, HAL.
- Hayrullah Dindar & Gilbert Laffond & Jean Laine, 2017.
"The strong referendum paradox,"
Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 51(4), pages 1707-1731, July.
- Hayrullah Dindar & Gilbert Laffond & Jean Lainé, 2017. "The strong referendum paradox," Post-Print hal-03271187, HAL.
- Dindar, Hayrullah & Lainé, Jean, 2017.
"Manipulation of single-winner large elections by vote pairing,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 161(C), pages 105-107.
- Hayrullah Dindar & Jean Lainé, 2017. "Manipulation of single-winner large elections by vote pairing," Post-Print hal-03271191, HAL.
Citations
Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.Working papers
- Fatma Aslan & Hayrullah Dindar & Jean Lainé, 2021.
"When are committees of Condorcet winners Condorcet winning committees?,"
Post-Print
hal-03335584, HAL.
- Fatma Aslan & Hayrullah Dindar & Jean Lainé, 2022. "When are committees of Condorcet winners Condorcet winning committees?," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 26(3), pages 417-446, September.
Cited by:
- Hayrullah Dindar & Jean Lainé, 2022.
"Compromise in combinatorial vote,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 59(1), pages 175-206, July.
- Hayrullah Dindar & Jean Lainé, 2022. "Compromise in combinatorial vote," Post-Print hal-03576075, HAL.
- Hayrullah Dindar & Gilbert Laffond & Jean Lainé, 2021.
"Referendum Paradox for Party-List Proportional Representation,"
Post-Print
hal-03335595, HAL.
- Hayrullah Dindar & Gilbert Laffond & Jean Lainé, 2021. "Referendum Paradox for Party-List Proportional Representation," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 30(1), pages 191-220, February.
Cited by:
- Arnold Cédrick SOH VOUTSA, 2020. "Approval Voting & Majority Judgment in Weighted Representative Democracy," THEMA Working Papers 2020-15, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- Hayrullah Dindar & Jean Lainé, 2017.
"Manipulation of single-winner large elections by vote pairing,"
Post-Print
hal-03271191, HAL.
- Dindar, Hayrullah & Lainé, Jean, 2017. "Manipulation of single-winner large elections by vote pairing," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 161(C), pages 105-107.
Cited by:
- Hayrullah Dindar & Jean Lainé, 2023.
"Vote swapping in irresolute two-tier voting procedures,"
Post-Print
hal-03958175, HAL.
- Hayrullah Dindar & Jean Lainé, 2023. "Vote swapping in irresolute two-tier voting procedures," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 61(2), pages 221-262, August.
- Kivinen, Steven, 2023. "On the manipulability of equitable voting rules," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 286-302.
- Hayrullah Dindar & Gilbert Laffond & Jean Lainé, 2017.
"The strong referendum paradox,"
Post-Print
hal-03271187, HAL.
- Hayrullah Dindar & Gilbert Laffond & Jean Laine, 2017. "The strong referendum paradox," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 51(4), pages 1707-1731, July.
Cited by:
- Hayrullah Dindar & Jean Lainé, 2023.
"Vote swapping in irresolute two-tier voting procedures,"
Post-Print
hal-03958175, HAL.
- Hayrullah Dindar & Jean Lainé, 2023. "Vote swapping in irresolute two-tier voting procedures," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 61(2), pages 221-262, August.
- Hayrullah Dindar & Gilbert Laffond & Jean Lainé, 2015.
"Vote Swapping in Representative Democracy,"
Post-Print
hal-03271247, HAL.
Cited by:
- Hayrullah Dindar & Jean Lainé, 2017.
"Manipulation of single-winner large elections by vote pairing,"
Post-Print
hal-03271191, HAL.
- Dindar, Hayrullah & Lainé, Jean, 2017. "Manipulation of single-winner large elections by vote pairing," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 161(C), pages 105-107.
- Hayrullah Dindar & Jean Lainé, 2017.
"Manipulation of single-winner large elections by vote pairing,"
Post-Print
hal-03271191, HAL.
Articles
- Fatma Aslan & Hayrullah Dindar & Jean Lainé, 2022.
"When are committees of Condorcet winners Condorcet winning committees?,"
Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 26(3), pages 417-446, September.
See citations under working paper version above.
- Fatma Aslan & Hayrullah Dindar & Jean Lainé, 2021. "When are committees of Condorcet winners Condorcet winning committees?," Post-Print hal-03335584, HAL.
- Hayrullah Dindar & Gilbert Laffond & Jean Lainé, 2021.
"Referendum Paradox for Party-List Proportional Representation,"
Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 30(1), pages 191-220, February.
See citations under working paper version above.
- Hayrullah Dindar & Gilbert Laffond & Jean Lainé, 2021. "Referendum Paradox for Party-List Proportional Representation," Post-Print hal-03335595, HAL.
- Hayrullah Dindar & Gilbert Laffond & Jean Laine, 2017.
"The strong referendum paradox,"
Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 51(4), pages 1707-1731, July.
See citations under working paper version above.
- Hayrullah Dindar & Gilbert Laffond & Jean Lainé, 2017. "The strong referendum paradox," Post-Print hal-03271187, HAL.
- Dindar, Hayrullah & Lainé, Jean, 2017.
"Manipulation of single-winner large elections by vote pairing,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 161(C), pages 105-107.
See citations under working paper version above.Sorry, no citations of articles recorded.
- Hayrullah Dindar & Jean Lainé, 2017. "Manipulation of single-winner large elections by vote pairing," Post-Print hal-03271191, HAL.
More information
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