IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/f/pbi203.html
   My authors  Follow this author

Omer Biran

Personal Details

First Name:Omer
Middle Name:
Last Name:Biran
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pbi203

Affiliation

Centre de Recherches en Mathématiques de la Décision (CEREMADE)
Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX)

Paris, France
http://www.ceremade.dauphine.fr/
RePEc:edi:cerp9fr (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Omer Biran, 2011. "Core stable bidding rings in independent private value auctions with externalities," Working Papers halshs-00608008, HAL.
  2. Omer Biran, 2010. "Strategic Collusion in Auctions with Externalities," Working Papers hal-00505477, HAL.
  3. Omer Biran & Francoise Forges, 2010. "Core-stable Rings in Auctions with Independent Private Values," CESifo Working Paper Series 3067, CESifo.

Articles

  1. Biran, Omer & Forges, Françoise, 2011. "Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 52-64, September.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Omer Biran, 2010. "Strategic Collusion in Auctions with Externalities," Working Papers hal-00505477, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Biran, Omer, 2011. "Core stable bidding rings in independent private value auctions with externalities," MPRA Paper 32164, University Library of Munich, Germany.

  2. Omer Biran & Francoise Forges, 2010. "Core-stable Rings in Auctions with Independent Private Values," CESifo Working Paper Series 3067, CESifo.

    Cited by:

    1. Françoise Forges & Roberto Serrano, 2013. "Cooperative Games with Incomplete Information : Some Open Problems," Post-Print hal-01519884, HAL.
    2. Jonathan Newton, 2019. "Agency Equilibrium," Games, MDPI, vol. 10(1), pages 1-15, March.
    3. Mikhail Safronov, 2016. "A Coasian Approach to Efficient Mechanism Design," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1619, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    4. Francoise Forges & Ram Orzach, 2011. "Core-stable rings in second price auctions with common values," Post-Print hal-00659016, HAL.
    5. Biran, Omer, 2011. "Core stable bidding rings in independent private value auctions with externalities," MPRA Paper 32164, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Francoise Forges, 2013. "A folk theorem for Bayesian games with commitment," Post-Print hal-01252953, HAL.
    7. Omer Biran, 2013. "Strategic collusion in auctions with externalities," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 75(1), pages 117-136, July.
    8. Olga Gorelkina, 2014. "Bidder Collusion and the Auction with Target Bids," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2014_10, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    9. Olga Gorelkina, 2018. "Collusion via Information Sharing and Optimal Auctions," Working Papers 20182, University of Liverpool, Department of Economics.
    10. Brangewitz, Sonja & Brockhoff, Sarah, 2017. "Sustainability of coalitional equilibria within repeated tax competition," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 1-23.
    11. Brangewitz, Sonja & Brockhoff, Sarah, 2014. "Stability of coalitional equilibria within repeated tax competition," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 461, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    12. Sonja Brangewitz & Sarah Brockhoff, 2012. "Stability of Coalitional Equilibria within Repeated Tax Competition," Working Papers CIE 48, Paderborn University, CIE Center for International Economics.
    13. Safronov, Mikhail, 2018. "Coalition-proof full efficient implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 659-677.

Articles

  1. Biran, Omer & Forges, Françoise, 2011. "Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 52-64, September.
    See citations under working paper version above.Sorry, no citations of articles recorded.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

Access and download statistics for all items

Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 2 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-COM: Industrial Competition (2) 2011-07-21 2011-07-27
  2. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory and Applications (2) 2011-07-21 2011-07-27
  3. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (2) 2011-07-21 2011-07-27
  4. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (1) 2011-07-27

Corrections

All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. For general information on how to correct material on RePEc, see these instructions.

To update listings or check citations waiting for approval, Omer Biran should log into the RePEc Author Service.

To make corrections to the bibliographic information of a particular item, find the technical contact on the abstract page of that item. There, details are also given on how to add or correct references and citations.

To link different versions of the same work, where versions have a different title, use this form. Note that if the versions have a very similar title and are in the author's profile, the links will usually be created automatically.

Please note that most corrections can take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.