Ichiro Obara
Personal Details
First Name: | Ichiro |
Middle Name: | |
Last Name: | Obara |
Suffix: | |
RePEc Short-ID: | pob3 |
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public] | |
https://sites.google.com/site/ichiroobara/ | |
Department of Economics UCLA, 405 Hilgard Ave., Los Angeles, CA 90095-1477 | |
(310)794-7098 | |
Terminal Degree: | 2001 Department of Economics; University of Pennsylvania (from RePEc Genealogy) |
Affiliation
Department of Economics
University of California-Los Angeles (UCLA)
Los Angeles, California (United States)http://www.econ.ucla.edu/
RePEc:edi:deuclus (more details at EDIRC)
Research output
Jump to: Working papers ArticlesWorking papers
- Daehyun Kim & Ichiro Obara, 2024. "Weighted Garbling," Papers 2410.21694, arXiv.org.
- Richard McLean & Ichiro Obara & Andrew Postlewaite, 2023.
"Uniformly Strict Equilibrium for Repeated Games with Private Monitoring and Communication,"
Papers
2311.12242, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2024.
- Richard McLean & Ichiro Obara & Andrew Postlewaite, 2023. "Uniformly Strict Equilibrium for Repeated Games with Private Monitoring and Communication," PIER Working Paper Archive 23-018, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
- Daehyun Kim & Ichiro Obara, 2023. "Asymptotic Value of Monitoring Structures in Stochastic Games," Papers 2308.09211, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2024.
- Ichiro Obara & Jaeok Park, 2015.
"Repeated Games with General Discounting,"
Working papers
2015rwp-84, Yonsei University, Yonsei Economics Research Institute.
- Obara, Ichiro & Park, Jaeok, 2017. "Repeated games with general discounting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 172(C), pages 348-375.
- Hongbin Cai & Ichiro Obara, 2008.
"Firm Reputation and Horizontal Integration,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
122247000000002038, David K. Levine.
- Hongbin Cai & Ichiro Obara, 2009. "Firm reputation and horizontal integration," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(2), pages 340-363, June.
- Hongbin Cai & Ichiro Obara, 2006. "Firm Reputation and Horizontanl Integration," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000285, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Cai, Hongbin, 2004. "Firm Reputation and Horizontal Integration," Santa Cruz Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt6rk9f1fm, Department of Economics, UC Santa Cruz.
- Ichiro Obara & David Rahman, 2008.
"Secret Contracts for Efficient Partnerships,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
122247000000002236, David K. Levine.
- David Rahman & Ichiro Obara, 2008. "Secret Contracts for Efficient Partnerships," Working Papers 2008-3, University of Minnesota, Department of Economics, revised 06 2008.
- David Rahman & Ichiro Obara, 2007. "Secret Contracts for Efficient Partnerships," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000934, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara, 2007. "Finite State Equilibria in Dynamic Games," 2007 Meeting Papers 253, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Ichiro Obara, 2007.
"Folk Theorem with Communication,"
Levine's Bibliography
784828000000000351, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Obara, Ichiro, 2009. "Folk theorem with communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 120-134, January.
- Ichiro Obara, 2005. "Folk Theorem with Communication," UCLA Economics Online Papers 366, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Ichiro Obara, 2006.
"The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions,"
Levine's Bibliography
122247000000001206, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Obara Ichiro, 2008. "The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 1-28, March.
- Ichiro Obara, 2007. "The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions," Levine's Bibliography 843644000000000137, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Ichiro Obara, "undated". "The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions," UCLA Economics Online Papers 374, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara, 2006.
"Less is more: An Observability Paradox in Repeated Games,"
Levine's Bibliography
321307000000000342, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara, 2006. "Less is more: an observability paradox in repeated games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 34(4), pages 475-493, November.
- Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara, 2003. "Less is More: An Observability Paradox in Repeated Gamess," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-246, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Ichiro Obara & David Rahman, 2006. "Approximate Implementability with Ex Post Budget Balance," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000280, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Rich McLean & Ichiro Obara & Andrew Postlewaite, 2005.
"Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games,"
Levine's Bibliography
784828000000000261, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Richard McLean & Ichiro Obara & Andrew Postlewaite, 2001. "Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 05-024, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 20 Jul 2005.
- Richard McLean & Ichiro Obara & Andrew Postlewaite, 2005. "Informational Smallness and Privae Momnitoring in Repeated Games, Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 11-029, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 10 Feb 2011.
- Ichiro Obara, 2005. "Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games (with R. McLean and A. Postlewaite)," UCLA Economics Online Papers 365, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara, 2004.
"Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies,"
Levine's Bibliography
122247000000000055, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara, 2006. "Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(2), pages 499-519, March.
- Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara, 2003. "Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-255, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara, 2003. "Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies," UCLA Economics Working Papers 826, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Ichiro Obara, 2004. "Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies (with M. Kandori)," UCLA Economics Online Papers 281, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Ichiro Obara, 2004. "Firm Reputation and Horizontal Integration (with H. Cai)," UCLA Economics Online Papers 318, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Ichiro Obara, 2003. "Less is More: An Observability Paradox in Repeated Games (with M. Kandori)," UCLA Economics Online Papers 275, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Ichiro Obara, 2000. "Private Strategy and Efficiency: Repeated Partnership Games Revisited," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1449, Econometric Society.
- George J. Mailath & Ichiro Obara & Tadashi Sekiguchi, "undated".
"The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma,"
Penn CARESS Working Papers
83719e84b6825736ffcfdfacb, Penn Economics Department.
- Mailath, George J. & Obara, Ichiro & Sekiguchi, Tadashi, 2002. "The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 99-122, July.
- Ichiro Obara, "undated".
"Endogenous Monitoring,"
UCLA Economics Online Papers
398, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara, 2004. "Endogeous Monitoring," 2004 Meeting Papers 752, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Ichiro Obara, "undated". "Secret Contracts for Efficient Partnerships (joint with D. Rahman)," UCLA Economics Online Papers 418, UCLA Department of Economics.
- V. Bhaskar & Ichiro Obara, "undated".
"Belief-Based Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Private Monitoring,"
Penn CARESS Working Papers
d93eb6f40c65728f9e1a7b114, Penn Economics Department.
- Bhaskar, V. & Obara, Ichiro, 2002. "Belief-Based Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Private Monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 40-69, January.
- V. Bhaskar & Ichiro Obara, 2000. "Belief-Based Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Private Monitoring," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1330, Econometric Society.
- Ichiro Obara, "undated".
"The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Private Monitoring: a N-player case,"
Penn CARESS Working Papers
ba7f35f1c50de4503e241d127, Penn Economics Department.
- Ichiro Obara, "undated". "The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Private Monitoring: a N-player case," CARESS Working Papres 99-13, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
- Ichiro Obara, "undated". "Approximate Implementability with Ex Post Budget Balance (Joint with D. Rahman)," UCLA Economics Online Papers 399, UCLA Department of Economics.
Articles
- Obara, Ichiro & Park, Jaeok, 2017.
"Repeated games with general discounting,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 172(C), pages 348-375.
- Ichiro Obara & Jaeok Park, 2015. "Repeated Games with General Discounting," Working papers 2015rwp-84, Yonsei University, Yonsei Economics Research Institute.
- Ichiro Obara & Federico Zincenko, 2017. "Collusion and heterogeneity of firms," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 48(1), pages 230-249, March.
- Sushil Bikhchandani & Ichiro Obara, 2017. "Mechanism design with information acquisition," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 63(3), pages 783-812, March.
- McLean, Richard & Obara, Ichiro & Postlewaite, Andrew, 2014. "Robustness of public equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 191-212.
- David Rahman & Ichiro Obara, 2010. "Mediated Partnerships," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(1), pages 285-308, January.
- Hongbin Cai & Ichiro Obara, 2009.
"Firm reputation and horizontal integration,"
RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(2), pages 340-363, June.
- Hongbin Cai & Ichiro Obara, 2006. "Firm Reputation and Horizontanl Integration," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000285, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Hongbin Cai & Ichiro Obara, 2008. "Firm Reputation and Horizontal Integration," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000002038, David K. Levine.
- Cai, Hongbin, 2004. "Firm Reputation and Horizontal Integration," Santa Cruz Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt6rk9f1fm, Department of Economics, UC Santa Cruz.
- Obara, Ichiro, 2009.
"Folk theorem with communication,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 120-134, January.
- Ichiro Obara, 2005. "Folk Theorem with Communication," UCLA Economics Online Papers 366, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Ichiro Obara, 2007. "Folk Theorem with Communication," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000351, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Obara Ichiro, 2008.
"The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions,"
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 1-28, March.
- Ichiro Obara, 2006. "The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001206, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Ichiro Obara, 2007. "The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions," Levine's Bibliography 843644000000000137, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Ichiro Obara, "undated". "The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions," UCLA Economics Online Papers 374, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara, 2006.
"Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(2), pages 499-519, March.
- Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara, 2003. "Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-255, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara, 2004. "Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000055, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara, 2003. "Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies," UCLA Economics Working Papers 826, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara, 2006.
"Less is more: an observability paradox in repeated games,"
International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 34(4), pages 475-493, November.
- Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara, 2006. "Less is more: An Observability Paradox in Repeated Games," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000342, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara, 2003. "Less is More: An Observability Paradox in Repeated Gamess," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-246, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Mailath, George J. & Obara, Ichiro & Sekiguchi, Tadashi, 2002.
"The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 99-122, July.
- George J. Mailath & Ichiro Obara & Tadashi Sekiguchi, "undated". "The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma," Penn CARESS Working Papers 83719e84b6825736ffcfdfacb, Penn Economics Department.
- Bhaskar, V. & Obara, Ichiro, 2002.
"Belief-Based Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Private Monitoring,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 40-69, January.
- V. Bhaskar & Ichiro Obara, "undated". "Belief-Based Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Private Monitoring," Penn CARESS Working Papers d93eb6f40c65728f9e1a7b114, Penn Economics Department.
- V. Bhaskar & Ichiro Obara, 2000. "Belief-Based Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Private Monitoring," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1330, Econometric Society.
More information
Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.Statistics
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Rankings
This author is among the top 5% authors according to these criteria:- Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors
- Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors
Co-authorship network on CollEc
NEP Fields
NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 14 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.- NEP-GTH: Game Theory (8) 2003-01-27 2005-09-02 2005-09-29 2006-02-19 2006-09-11 2015-10-04 2023-09-25 2023-12-18. Author is listed
- NEP-IND: Industrial Organization (4) 2003-02-03 2003-11-23 2004-09-30 2006-08-19
- NEP-BEC: Business Economics (3) 2006-08-19 2008-06-21 2008-07-05
- NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (3) 2015-10-04 2023-09-25 2023-12-18
- NEP-CTA: Contract Theory and Applications (2) 2008-06-21 2008-07-05
- NEP-COM: Industrial Competition (1) 2004-09-30
- NEP-EXP: Experimental Economics (1) 2006-09-11
- NEP-HPE: History and Philosophy of Economics (1) 2015-10-04
- NEP-MAC: Macroeconomics (1) 2004-01-05
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