Paul S. Nelson

Personal Details

First Name:	Paul
Middle Name:	S.
Last Name:	Nelson
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:	pne156
	[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]

Affiliation

Department of Accounting
University of Louisiana

Monroe, Louisiana (United States)
https://www.ulm.edu/cbss/accounting/
RePEc:edi:deulmus (more details at EDIRC)

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

1. Paul W. Grimes & Paul S. Nelson, 1995. "The Social Issues Pedagogy vs. the Traditional Principles of Economics: An Empirical Examination," GE, Growth, Math methods 9510001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
   • Paul W. Grimes & Paul S. Nelson, 1998. "The Social Issues Pedagogy vs. The Traditional Principles of Economics: An Empirical Examination," The American Economist, Sage Publications, vol. 42(1), pages 56-64, March.
   • Grimes, Paul W. & Nelson, Paul S., 1998. "The social issues pedagogy vs. the traditional principles of economics: an empirical examination," MPRA Paper 39972, University Library of Munich, Germany.

   Cited by:

   1. Geoffrey Schneider, 2011. "The Purpose, Structure and Content of the Principles of Economics Course," Chapters, in: Gail M. Hoyt & KimMarie McGoldrick (ed.), International Handbook on Teaching and Learning Economics, chapter 27, Edward Elgar Publishing.
   2. Steven Dickey & Robert Houston Jr., 2009. "Disaggregating Education Production," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 37(2), pages 135-144, June.
   3. Tisha L. N. Emerson & KimMarie McGoldrick, 2023. "An investigation of unsuccessful performance and subsequent retake behavior in principles of economics," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 89(3), pages 986-1021, January.
   4. Patrick B. O'Neill, 2001. "Essay versus Multiple Choice Exams; An Experiment in the Principles of Macroeconomics Course," The American Economist, Sage Publications, vol. 45(1), pages 62-70, March.
   5. Carlos J. Asarta & Austin S. Jennings & Paul W. Grimes, 2017. "Economic Education Retrospective," The American Economist, Sage Publications, vol. 62(1), pages 102-117, March.

Articles

1. Holcomb, James H. & Nelson, Paul S., 1997. "The role of monitoring in duopoly market outcomes," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 79-93.

   Cited by:

   1. Waichman, Israel & Requate, Till & Siang, Ch'ng Kean, 2010. "Pre-play communication in Cournot competition: An experiment with students and managers," Economics Working Papers 2010-09, Christian-Albrechts-University of Kiel, Department of Economics.
   2. Alexia Gaudeul & Paolo Crosetto & Gerhard Riener, 2015. "Of the stability of partnerships when individuals have outside options, or why allowing exit is inefficient," Jena Economics Research Papers 2015-001, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
      • Paolo Crosetto & Alexia Gaudeul & Gerhard Riener, 2012. "Partnerships, Imperfect Monitoring and Outside Options: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Jena Economics Research Papers 2012-052, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
      • Gaudeul, A. & Crosetto, P. & Riener, G., 2014. "Fear of being left alone drives inefficient exit from partnerships. An experiment," Working Papers 2014-02, Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL).
   3. Goeschl, Timo & Jarke, Johannes, 2017. "Trust, but verify? Monitoring, inspection costs, and opportunism under limited observability," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 320-330.
   4. Bigoni, Maria & Potters, Jan & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2019. "Frequency of interaction, communication and collusion : An experiment," Other publications TiSEM 0c07d1aa-a6b8-4472-9a83-5, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
      • Maria Bigoni & Jan Potters & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2019. "Frequency of interaction, communication and collusion: an experiment," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 68(4), pages 827-844, November.
   5. Goeschl, Timo & Jarke, Johannes, 2014. "Trust, but verify? When trustworthiness is observable only through (costly) monitoring," WiSo-HH Working Paper Series 20, University of Hamburg, Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences, WISO Research Laboratory.
   6. John A. List, 2009. "The Economics of Open Air Markets," NBER Working Papers 15420, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
   7. Masaki Aoyagi & V. Bhaskar & Guillaume R. Fréchette, 2019. "The Impact of Monitoring in Infinitely Repeated Games: Perfect, Public, and Private," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 11(1), pages 1-43, February.
      • Masaki Aoyagi & V. Bhaskar & Guillaume R. Frechette, 2015. "The Impact of Monitoring in Infinitely Repeated Games: Perfect, Public, and Private," ISER Discussion Paper 0942, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
   8. Andrew Kloosterman, 2020. "Cooperation in stochastic games: a prisoner’s dilemma experiment," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 23(2), pages 447-467, June.
   9. Masaki Aoyagi & Guillaume R. Frechette, 2004. "Collusion in Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000127, UCLA Department of Economics.
   10. Spagnolo, Giancarlo & Potters, Jan & Bigoni, Maria, 2012. "Flexibility and Collusion with Imperfect Monitoring," CEPR Discussion Papers 8877, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
   11. Aoyagi, Masaki & Fréchette, Guillaume, 2009. "Collusion as public monitoring becomes noisy: Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 1135-1165, May.
   12. Sawa, Ryoji, 2021. "A stochastic stability analysis with observation errors in normal form games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 570-589.
   13. Alexia Gaudeul & Paolo Crosetto & Gerhard Riener, 2014. "Fear of being left alone drives inefficient exit from partnerships. An experiment," Jena Economics Research Papers 2014-012, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
       • Paolo Crosetto & Alexia Gaudeul & Gerhard Riener, 2012. "Partnerships, Imperfect Monitoring and Outside Options: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Jena Economics Research Papers 2012-052, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
       • Gaudeul, A. & Crosetto, P. & Riener, G., 2014. "Fear of being left alone drives inefficient exit from partnerships. An experiment," Working Papers 2014-02, Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL).
   14. Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomohisa Toyama, 2011. "Monitoring Accuracy and Retaliation in Infinitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Theory and Experiments," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-795, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.

2. Holcomb, James H. & Nelson, Paul S., 1991. "Cartel failure: A mistake or do they do it to each other on purpose?," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 235-249.

   Cited by:

   1. Holcomb, James H. & Nelson, Paul S., 1997. "The role of monitoring in duopoly market outcomes," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 79-93.

More information

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Corrections

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