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Bram Driesen

Personal Details

First Name:Bram
Middle Name:
Last Name:Driesen
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pdr101
http://www.bramdriesen.eu
Univ. of Glasgow - ASBS, University Avenue, G12 8QQ Glasgow, United Kingdom
++44 141 330 5508

Affiliation

Department of Economics
Adam Smith Business School
University of Glasgow

Glasgow, United Kingdom
http://www.gla.ac.uk/subjects/economics/
RePEc:edi:dpglauk (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

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Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Driesen, B.W.I. & Lombardi, M. & Peters, H.J.M., 2015. "Feasible sets, comparative risk aversion, and comparative uncertainty aversion in bargaining," Research Memorandum 031, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
  2. Driesen, Bram W., 2012. "The Asymmetric Leximin Solution," Working Papers 0523, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
  3. Bram Driesen, 2011. "Proportional Concessions and the Leximin Solution," Working Paper Series 1106, Óbuda University, Keleti Faculty of Business and Management.
  4. Driesen, B.W.I. & Perea ý Monsuwé, A. & Peters, H.J.M., 2009. "Alternating offers bargaining with loss aversion," Research Memorandum 001, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  5. Driesen, B.W.I., 2009. "Continuous fictitious play in zero-sum games," Research Memorandum 049, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  6. Driesen, B.W.I. & Perea ý Monsuwé, A. & Peters, H.J.M., 2009. "The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution with loss aversion," Research Memorandum 030, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  7. Driesen, B.W.I. & Perea ý Monsuwé, A. & Peters, H.J.M., 2007. "On loss aversion in bimatrix games," Research Memorandum 033, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).

Articles

  1. Bram Driesen & Peter Eccles & Nora Wegner, 2017. "A non-cooperative foundation for the continuous Raiffa solution," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(4), pages 1115-1135, November.
  2. Driesen, Bram & Lombardi, Michele & Peters, Hans, 2016. "Feasible sets, comparative risk aversion, and comparative uncertainty aversion in bargaining," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 162-170.
  3. Driesen, Bram, 2016. "Truncated Leximin solutions," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 79-87.
  4. Bram Driesen, 2016. "Bargaining, conditional consistency, and weighted lexicographic Kalai-Smorodinsky Solutions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46(4), pages 777-809, April.
  5. Baillon, Aurélien & Driesen, Bram & Wakker, Peter P., 2012. "Relative concave utility for risk and ambiguity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 481-489.
  6. Driesen, Bram, 2012. "Proportional concessions and the leximin solution," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 114(3), pages 288-291.
  7. Driesen, Bram & Perea, Andrés & Peters, Hans, 2012. "Alternating offers bargaining with loss aversion," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 103-118.
  8. Driesen, Bram & Perea, Andrés & Peters, Hans, 2011. "The Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution with loss aversion," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 58-64, January.
  9. Bram Driesen & Andrés Perea & Hans Peters, 2010. "On Loss Aversion in Bimatrix Games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 68(4), pages 367-391, April.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Driesen, B.W.I. & Lombardi, M. & Peters, H.J.M., 2015. "Feasible sets, comparative risk aversion, and comparative uncertainty aversion in bargaining," Research Memorandum 031, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).

    Cited by:

    1. Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2018. "Partially-Honest Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization," Discussion Paper Series 682, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    2. William Thomson, 2022. "On the axiomatic theory of bargaining: a survey of recent results," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 26(4), pages 491-542, December.

  2. Driesen, Bram W., 2012. "The Asymmetric Leximin Solution," Working Papers 0523, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Jaume García-Segarra & Miguel Ginés-Vilar, 2013. "Stagnation proofness and individually monotonic bargaining solutions," Working Papers 2013/04, Economics Department, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón (Spain).

  3. Bram Driesen, 2011. "Proportional Concessions and the Leximin Solution," Working Paper Series 1106, Óbuda University, Keleti Faculty of Business and Management.

    Cited by:

    1. William Thomson, 2022. "On the axiomatic theory of bargaining: a survey of recent results," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 26(4), pages 491-542, December.
    2. Bram Driesen, 2016. "Bargaining, conditional consistency, and weighted lexicographic Kalai-Smorodinsky Solutions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46(4), pages 777-809, April.
    3. Driesen, Bram W., 2012. "The Asymmetric Leximin Solution," Working Papers 0523, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.

  4. Driesen, B.W.I. & Perea ý Monsuwé, A. & Peters, H.J.M., 2009. "Alternating offers bargaining with loss aversion," Research Memorandum 001, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).

    Cited by:

    1. Zhongwei Feng & Chunqiao Tan & Jinchun Zhang & Qiang Zeng, 2021. "Bargaining Game with Altruistic and Spiteful Preferences," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 30(2), pages 277-300, April.
    2. William Thomson, 2022. "On the axiomatic theory of bargaining: a survey of recent results," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 26(4), pages 491-542, December.
    3. Tarık Kara & Emin Karagözoğlu & Elif Özcan-Tok, 2021. "Bargaining, Reference Points, and Limited Influence," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 326-362, June.
    4. Zhaoyu Cao & Yucheng Zou & Xu Zhao & Kairong Hong & Yanwei Zhang, 2021. "Multidimensional Fairness Equilibrium Evaluation of Urban Housing Expropriation Compensation Based on VIKOR," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 9(4), pages 1-26, February.
    5. Stefan Kohler, 2012. "Incomplete Information about Social Preferences Explains Equal Division and Delay in Bargaining," Games, MDPI, vol. 3(3), pages 1-19, September.
    6. Zhen Li & Jia Zhao & Qingfeng Meng, 2022. "Dual-channel recycling e-waste pricing decision under the impact of recyclers’ loss aversion and consumers’ bargaining power," Environment, Development and Sustainability: A Multidisciplinary Approach to the Theory and Practice of Sustainable Development, Springer, vol. 24(10), pages 11697-11720, October.
    7. Sawa, Ryoji, 2021. "A prospect theory Nash bargaining solution and its stochastic stability," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 184(C), pages 692-711.
    8. Zhaoyu Cao & Xu Zhao & Yucheng Zou & Kairong Hong & Yanwei Zhang, 2021. "Multidimensional Fair Fuzzy Equilibrium Evaluation of Housing Expropriation Compensation from the Perspective of Behavioral Preference: A Case Study from China," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 9(6), pages 1-22, March.
    9. Khan, Abhimanyu, 2022. "Expected utility versus cumulative prospect theory in an evolutionary model of bargaining," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 137(C).
    10. Zhongwei Feng & Chunqiao Tan, 2019. "Pricing, Green Degree and Coordination Decisions in a Green Supply Chain with Loss Aversion," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 7(3), pages 1-25, March.
    11. Zhongwei Feng & Yan Ma & Yuzhong Yang, 2023. "Credibilistic Cournot Game with Risk Aversion under a Fuzzy Environment," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 11(4), pages 1-18, February.
    12. Kohler, Stefan, 2012. "Envy can promote more equal division in alternating-offer bargaining," MPRA Paper 40761, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Chunsheng Cui & Zhongwei Feng & Chunqiao Tan, 2018. "Credibilistic Loss Aversion Nash Equilibrium for Bimatrix Games with Triangular Fuzzy Payoffs," Complexity, Hindawi, vol. 2018, pages 1-16, December.
    14. Yu, Zhixian, 2020. "Alternating-offer bargaining with endogenous commitment," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 192(C).
    15. Zhongwei Feng & Chunqiao Tan, 2019. "Subgame Perfect Equilibrium in the Rubinstein Bargaining Game with Loss Aversion," Complexity, Hindawi, vol. 2019, pages 1-23, March.
    16. Emin Karagözoğlu & Kerim Keskin, 2018. "Endogenous reference points in bargaining," Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research (GOR);Nederlands Genootschap voor Besliskunde (NGB), vol. 88(2), pages 283-295, October.
    17. Emin Karagözoğlu & Kerim Keskin, 2015. "A Tale of Two Bargaining Solutions," Games, MDPI, vol. 6(2), pages 1-14, June.
    18. Wentao Yi & Zhongwei Feng & Chunqiao Tan & Yuzhong Yang, 2021. "Green Supply Chain Management with Nash Bargaining Loss-Averse Reference Dependence," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 9(24), pages 1-26, December.
    19. Husnain Fateh Ahmad, 2020. "Self serving reference points in k−double auctions," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 72(1), pages 77-85, January.

  5. Driesen, B.W.I., 2009. "Continuous fictitious play in zero-sum games," Research Memorandum 049, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).

    Cited by:

    1. Ewerhart, Christian & Valkanova, Kremena, 2020. "Fictitious play in networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 123(C), pages 182-206.

  6. Driesen, B.W.I. & Perea ý Monsuwé, A. & Peters, H.J.M., 2009. "The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution with loss aversion," Research Memorandum 030, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).

    Cited by:

    1. Qi Feng & Yuanchen Li & J. George Shanthikumar, 2022. "Negotiations in Competing Supply Chains: The Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(8), pages 5868-5890, August.
    2. Driesen, Bram, 2012. "Proportional concessions and the leximin solution," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 114(3), pages 288-291.
    3. Schumacher, Heiner & Karle, Heiko & Volund, Rune, 2016. "Settlement Offers," VfS Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145772, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    4. Chunsheng Cui & Zhongwei Feng & Chunqiao Tan, 2018. "Credibilistic Loss Aversion Nash Equilibrium for Bimatrix Games with Triangular Fuzzy Payoffs," Complexity, Hindawi, vol. 2018, pages 1-16, December.
    5. Kristal K. Trejo & Julio B. Clempner & Alexander S. Poznyak, 2019. "Computing the Bargaining Approach for Equalizing the Ratios of Maximal Gains in Continuous-Time Markov Chains Games," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 54(3), pages 933-955, October.
    6. Emin Karagözoğlu & Kerim Keskin, 2018. "Endogenous reference points in bargaining," Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research (GOR);Nederlands Genootschap voor Besliskunde (NGB), vol. 88(2), pages 283-295, October.
    7. Wentao Yi & Zhongwei Feng & Chunqiao Tan & Yuzhong Yang, 2021. "Green Supply Chain Management with Nash Bargaining Loss-Averse Reference Dependence," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 9(24), pages 1-26, December.

  7. Driesen, B.W.I. & Perea ý Monsuwé, A. & Peters, H.J.M., 2007. "On loss aversion in bimatrix games," Research Memorandum 033, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).

    Cited by:

    1. Driesen, B.W.I. & Perea ý Monsuwé, A. & Peters, H.J.M., 2007. "On loss aversion in bimatrix games," Research Memorandum 033, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    2. Dato, Simon & Grunewald, Andreas & Müller, Daniel & Strack, Philipp, 2017. "Expectation-based loss aversion and strategic interaction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 681-705.
    3. Peters, Hans, 2012. "A preference foundation for constant loss aversion," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 21-25.
    4. Li, Qianwen & Qian, Tingyu & Zhang, Xufeng & Long, Ruyin & Chen, Hong & Huang, Han & Liu, Lei & Zhu, Licai & Jiang, Huikang & Zhu, Hanyi, 2023. "How does stakeholder loss aversion affect the promotion of green housing?," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 647-668.
    5. Chunsheng Cui & Zhongwei Feng & Chunqiao Tan, 2018. "Credibilistic Loss Aversion Nash Equilibrium for Bimatrix Games with Triangular Fuzzy Payoffs," Complexity, Hindawi, vol. 2018, pages 1-16, December.
    6. Wentao Yi & Zhongwei Feng & Chunqiao Tan & Yuzhong Yang, 2021. "Green Supply Chain Management with Nash Bargaining Loss-Averse Reference Dependence," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 9(24), pages 1-26, December.

Articles

  1. Bram Driesen & Peter Eccles & Nora Wegner, 2017. "A non-cooperative foundation for the continuous Raiffa solution," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(4), pages 1115-1135, November.

    Cited by:

    1. William Thomson, 2022. "On the axiomatic theory of bargaining: a survey of recent results," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 26(4), pages 491-542, December.
    2. Roberto Serrano, 2020. "Sixty-Seven Years of the Nash Program: Time for Retirement?," Working Papers 2020-20, Brown University, Department of Economics.

  2. Driesen, Bram & Lombardi, Michele & Peters, Hans, 2016. "Feasible sets, comparative risk aversion, and comparative uncertainty aversion in bargaining," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 162-170.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  3. Driesen, Bram, 2016. "Truncated Leximin solutions," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 79-87.

    Cited by:

    1. William Thomson, 2022. "On the axiomatic theory of bargaining: a survey of recent results," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 26(4), pages 491-542, December.
    2. Dominik Karos & Nozomu Muto & Shiran Rachmilevitch, 2018. "A generalization of the Egalitarian and the Kalai–Smorodinsky bargaining solutions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 47(4), pages 1169-1182, November.
    3. Jaume García-Segarra & Miguel Ginés-Vilar, 2019. "Stagnation proofness in n-agent bargaining problems," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 14(1), pages 215-224, March.

  4. Baillon, Aurélien & Driesen, Bram & Wakker, Peter P., 2012. "Relative concave utility for risk and ambiguity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 481-489.

    Cited by:

    1. BERGER, Loïc & BLEICHRODT, Han & EECKHOUDT, Louis, 2013. "Treatment decisions under ambiguity," LIDAM Reprints CORE 2494, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    2. Mohammed Abdellaoui & Enrico Diecidue & Emmanuel Kemel & Ayse Onculer, 2021. "Temporal Risk Resolution: Utility versus Probability Weighting Approaches," Working Papers hal-03330225, HAL.
    3. Larry G. Epstein & Martin Schneider, 2010. "Ambiguity and Asset Markets," NBER Working Papers 16181, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Olivier L'Haridon & Mohammed Abdellaoui & A. Driouchi, 2011. "Risk aversion elicitation: reconciling tractability and bias minimization," Post-Print hal-00609543, HAL.
    5. Craig Webb, 2010. "Agreeing to spin the subjective roulette wheel: Bargaining with subjective mixtures," Economics Discussion Paper Series 1005, Economics, The University of Manchester.
    6. Jinrui Pan & Craig Webb & Horst Zank, 2013. "Discounting the Subjective Present and Future," Economics Discussion Paper Series 1305, Economics, The University of Manchester.
    7. Aurélien Baillon & Olivier L’Haridon, 2021. "Discrete Arrow–Pratt indexes for risk and uncertainty," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(4), pages 1375-1393, November.
    8. Xiangyu Qu, 2015. "A belief-based definition of ambiguity aversion," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 79(1), pages 15-30, July.
    9. Christoph Bühren & Fabian Meier & Marco Pleßner, 2023. "Ambiguity aversion: bibliometric analysis and literature review of the last 60 years," Management Review Quarterly, Springer, vol. 73(2), pages 495-525, June.
    10. Katarzyna Werner & Horst Zank, 2012. "Foundations for Prospect Theory Through Probability Midpoint Consistency," Economics Discussion Paper Series 1210, Economics, The University of Manchester.
    11. Katarzyna M. Werner & Horst Zank, 2019. "A revealed reference point for prospect theory," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 67(4), pages 731-773, June.
    12. Pan, Jinrui & Webb, Craig S. & Zank, Horst, 2015. "An extension of quasi-hyperbolic discounting to continuous time," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 43-55.
    13. Mohammed Abdellaoui & Horst Zank, 2023. "Source and rank-dependent utility," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 75(4), pages 949-981, May.
    14. Ulrich Schmidt & Horst Zank, 2012. "A genuine foundation for prospect theory," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 45(2), pages 97-113, October.
    15. Wakker, Peter P. & Yang, Jingni, 2019. "A powerful tool for analyzing concave/convex utility and weighting functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 181(C), pages 143-159.
    16. Vieider, Ferdinand M. & Cingl, Lubomír & Martinsson, Peter & Stojic, Hrvoje, 2013. "Separating attitudes towards money from attitudes towards probabilities: Stake effects and ambiguity as a test for prospect theory," Discussion Papers, WZB Junior Research Group Risk and Development SP II 2013-401, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    17. Aurélien Baillon & Ning Liu & Dennie Dolder, 2017. "Comparing uncertainty aversion towards different sources," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 83(1), pages 1-18, June.

  5. Driesen, Bram, 2012. "Proportional concessions and the leximin solution," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 114(3), pages 288-291.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  6. Driesen, Bram & Perea, Andrés & Peters, Hans, 2012. "Alternating offers bargaining with loss aversion," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 103-118.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  7. Driesen, Bram & Perea, Andrés & Peters, Hans, 2011. "The Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution with loss aversion," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 58-64, January.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  8. Bram Driesen & Andrés Perea & Hans Peters, 2010. "On Loss Aversion in Bimatrix Games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 68(4), pages 367-391, April.
    See citations under working paper version above.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

Access and download statistics for all items

Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 5 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (3) 2009-01-31 2012-03-08 2015-12-28
  2. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (2) 2012-03-08 2015-12-28
  3. NEP-BEC: Business Economics (1) 2009-01-31
  4. NEP-CBE: Cognitive and Behavioural Economics (1) 2015-12-28
  5. NEP-COM: Industrial Competition (1) 2009-07-28
  6. NEP-LAB: Labour Economics (1) 2009-10-31
  7. NEP-SBM: Small Business Management (1) 2009-07-28
  8. NEP-TID: Technology and Industrial Dynamics (1) 2009-07-28
  9. NEP-UPT: Utility Models and Prospect Theory (1) 2015-12-28

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