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Akteure – Mechanismen – Modelle: Zur Theoriefähigkeit makro-sozialer Analysen

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  • Mayntz, Renate

Abstract

In diesem Buch geht es um die Frage, ob und wie sich aus im Wesentlichen qualitativen empirischen Studien über soziale und politische Makrophänomene - zum Beispiel den Institutionenwandel im Gesundheitssystem, einen sozialpolitischen Entscheidungsprozess oder die Entwicklung internationaler Organisationen - theoretische Schlussfolgerungen ziehen lassen, die über diese konkreten Fälle hinausreichen. Die Theoriefähigkeit makro-sozialer Analysen war Gegenstand einer Vorlesungsreihe international renommierter Historiker, Wissenschaftstheoretiker und Sozialwissenschaftler am MPIfG in den Jahren 2000 und 2001. Die überarbeiteten Vorträge werden von der Herausgeberin einleitend zu einem Argument zusammengefasst, das die Ausgangsfrage beantwortet.

Suggested Citation

  • Mayntz, Renate (ed.), 2002. "Akteure – Mechanismen – Modelle: Zur Theoriefähigkeit makro-sozialer Analysen," Schriften aus dem Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung Köln, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, volume 42, number 42.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:mpifgs:42
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