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The Manifesto-Media Link: How Mass Media Mediate Manifesto Messages

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  • Merz, Nicolas

Abstract

This study analyzes whether media coverage covers messages from parties’ electoral programs (manifestos). Electoral programs contain detailed information on a party’s future policy-making. However, few voters read electoral programs. Still, prior research often assumed that the content of manifestos is known to voters because media disseminate the content of manifestos to voters. This dissertation evaluates this “mediation assumption” empirically, and analyzes whether and how the mass media cover parties’ electoral programs during the electoral campaign. If media coverage did not reflect parties’ electoral programs, citizens would have no chance to base their vote choice on evaluations of those programs. This study introduces the concept of the manifesto-media link in order to describe how media coverage can reflect programmatic offers. The manifesto-media link is formulated as three conditions that can be empirically evaluated and tested in a similar way to the conditions of the responsible party model. These are: First, media must cover similar issues to those that parties cover in their electoral programs. Second, media coverage must link issues with parties that emphasize these issues more than their competitors, in order to inform about the parties’ issue priorities. Third, media must frame parties as left or right in a way that represents how parties emphasize left or right positions in their own manifestos. Methodologically, the study combines secondary content analytical data on media coverage during the electoral campaign with data based on electoral programs. The findings suggest that the manifesto-media link is stable and robust. There is little to no systematic bias in favor of a certain type of party, however there are differences between quality and tabloid media. These findings contribute to our understanding of political representation and the functioning of political competition.

Suggested Citation

  • Merz, Nicolas, 2017. "The Manifesto-Media Link: How Mass Media Mediate Manifesto Messages," EconStor Books, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, number 175436, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:esmono:175436
    DOI: 10.18452/18863
    Note: Dissertationsschrift / PhD Thesis, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Kultur-, Sozial- und Bildungswissenschaftliche Fakultät, 2017
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Mattia Zulianello, 2014. "Analyzing party competition through the comparative manifesto data: some theoretical and methodological considerations," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 48(3), pages 1723-1737, May.
    2. Guy D. Whitten & Laron K. Williams, 2011. "Buttery Guns and Welfare Hawks: The Politics of Defense Spending in Advanced Industrial Democracies," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 55(1), pages 117-134, January.
    3. Wenzelburger, Georg, 2015. "Parties, Institutions and the Politics of Law and Order: How Political Institutions and Partisan Ideologies Shape Law-and-Order Spending in Twenty Western Industrialized Countries," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 45(3), pages 663-687, July.
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