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Intergovernmental Reforms in the Russian Federation : One Step Forward, Two Steps Back?

Author

Listed:
  • Migara O. De Silva
  • Galina Kurlyandskaya
  • Elena Andreeva
  • Natalia Golovanova

Abstract

Intergovernmental reforms in the Russian Federation: one step forward, two steps back? Is a critical analysis of Russia's intergovernmental reform program which began in the early 1990s. It assesses the effects of a broad range of reforms adopted over two tumultuous decades during which the Russian Federation experienced significant, and at times drastic, political regime changes, coupled with a similarly turbulent economic growth trajectory. This environment reshaped intergovernmental relations, requiring certain fiscal responsibilities to be delegated to the sub-national levels. These reforms, however, were not always accompanied by the kinds of administrative and political structures required to support a truly devolved system of intergovernmental fiscal relations. As this study indicates, in recent years there has been a tendency to recentralize some powers that had been granted to sub-national governments under earlier reforms, a trend that may call into question the future of fiscal decentralization in the federation. Moreover, the current global economic downturn has had a significant effect on Russia' economic growth, largely because of the country's overdependence on oil, gas, and mineral exports. It is likely that in the present economic climate the political regime will be inclined to further limit sub-national autonomy.

Suggested Citation

  • Migara O. De Silva & Galina Kurlyandskaya & Elena Andreeva & Natalia Golovanova, 2009. "Intergovernmental Reforms in the Russian Federation : One Step Forward, Two Steps Back?," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 2668.
    • Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbpubs:2668
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. Sokolov, Vladimir & Solanko, Laura, 2016. "Political influence, firm performance and survival," BOFIT Discussion Papers 20/2016, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition.
    2. Alexeev, Michael & Chernyavskiy, Andrey, 2018. "A tale of two crises: Federal transfers and regional economies in Russia in 2009 and 2014–2015," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 175-185.
    3. Paustyan, Ekaterina, 2021. "Politically motivated intergovernmental transfers in Russia : The case of the 2018 FIFA World Cup," BOFIT Discussion Papers 2/2021, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition.
    4. Elena Jarocinska, 2014. "Institutions of the Russian fiscal federalism: 20 years of evolution," CASE Network E-briefs 2, CASE-Center for Social and Economic Research.
    5. repec:zbw:bofitp:2016_020 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Leppänen, Simo & Solanko, Laura & Kosonen, Riitta, 2015. "Could climate change affect government expenditures? Early evidence from the Russian regions," BOFIT Discussion Papers 27/2015, Bank of Finland Institute for Emerging Economies (BOFIT).
    7. World Bank, 2011. "Russian federation : Social Expenditure and Fiscal Federalism in Russia," World Bank Publications - Reports 2735, The World Bank Group.
    8. Alexeev, Michael & Weber, Shlomo, 2013. "Russian Fiscal Federalism: Impact of Political and Fiscal (De)centralization," CEPR Discussion Papers 9356, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    9. repec:zbw:bofitp:2021_002 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Alexeev, Michael & Mamedov, Arseny, 2017. "Factors determining intra-regional fiscal decentralization in Russia and the US," Russian Journal of Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 425-444.
    11. Simo Leppänen & Laura Solanko & Riitta Kosonen, 2017. "The Impact of Climate Change on Regional Government Expenditures: Evidence from Russia," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 67(1), pages 67-92, May.
    12. Richard M. Bird, 2012. "Subnational Taxation in Large Emerging Countries: BRIC Plus One," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper1201, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
    13. David Szakonyi, 2018. "Private Sector Policymaking," Working Papers 2018-8, The George Washington University, Institute for International Economic Policy.
    14. Irina Sinitsina, 2011. "Public Expenditures on Education and Health in Russian Federation before and during the Global Crisis," CASE Network Reports 0103, CASE-Center for Social and Economic Research.
    15. Paustyan, Ekaterina, 2021. "Politically motivated intergovernmental transfers in Russia: The case of the 2018 FIFA World Cup," BOFIT Discussion Papers 2/2021, Bank of Finland Institute for Emerging Economies (BOFIT).
    16. Leppänen, Simo & Solanko, Laura & Kosonen, Riitta, 2015. "Could climate change affect government expenditures? Early evidence from the Russian regions," BOFIT Discussion Papers 27/2015, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition.
    17. repec:zbw:bofitp:2015_027 is not listed on IDEAS
    18. Oding, Nina (Одинг, Нина) & Savulkin, Lev (Савулькин, Лев) & Yushkov, Andrey (Юшков, Андрей), 2016. "Fiscal Federalism in Russia through the Lens of Government Programs Implementation [Российский Бюджетный Федерализм Через Призму Реализации Правительственных Программ]," Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 4, pages 93-114, August.
    19. Andrey Yushkov & Lev Savulkin & Nina Oding, 2017. "Intergovernmental Relations in Russia: Still a Pendulum?," Public administration issues, Higher School of Economics, issue 5, pages 38-59.
    20. Yushkov, Andrey, 2015. "Fiscal decentralization and regional economic growth: Theory, empirics, and the Russian experience," Russian Journal of Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(4), pages 404-418.

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