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Structural Reforms Without Prejudices

Editor

Listed:
  • Boeri, Tito
    (Professor of Economics, Bocconi University and Fondazione Rodolfo DeBenedetti)

  • Castanheira, Micael
    (Professor of Economics at the Universite Libre de Bruxelles)

  • Faini, Riccardo
    (Professor of Economics, Universita degli Studi di Roma "Tor Vergata")

  • Galasso, Vincenzo
    (Associate Professor of Economics, Bocconi University and IGIER)

Abstract

Our economies face constant challenges from many different directions. Structural reforms are implemented every day, either to grasp the benefits of globalization and technological change, or to avoid foundering on unaffordable welfare systems or the rise of new economies. Despite this flurry of reforms, many of their effects are insufficiently understood. What makes reforms a success or a failure? Why do we witness systematically ambivalent attitudes to reforms? Can governments implement reforms differently, without inflicting prejudice to large fringes of the population? This book explores these issues by comparing a number of reforms, across a large set of countries and sectors. First, through an innovative multisectorial input-output analysis, the authors compare the effects of liberalisation reforms in the telecommunication and electricity sectors across Europe. Surprisingly, they find that very similar and well-intended reforms can generate highly contrasted outcomes. It is also shown that governments must consider the effects of each reform on all sectors of the economy. Second, the authors explore how governments can tailor their reform strategy to alter the redistributive effects of reforms. They show that the government's approach to reforms has been very different across time and across countries. A government's approach depends on local institutions, on the nature of the opposition, and on the scope of the reform under way. The authors, however, show that governments do have alternatives. Often, there are ways to tailor reforms so as to protect specific parts of the population; and there are ways to experiment gradually, to avoid costly policy mistakes.

Suggested Citation

  • Boeri, Tito & Castanheira, Micael & Faini, Riccardo & Galasso, Vincenzo (ed.), 2006. "Structural Reforms Without Prejudices," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199203628.
  • Handle: RePEc:oxp:obooks:9780199203628
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Vincenzo Galasso, 2013. "Getting Fitter," CESifo Forum, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 14(03), pages 25-34, October.
    2. Vincenzo Galasso, 2012. "The Political Feasibility of Postponing Retirement," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 10(4), pages 27-31, December.
    3. Matteo Cacciatore & Romain Duval & Giuseppe Fiori & Fabio Ghironi, 2021. "Market Reforms at the Zero Lower Bound," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 53(4), pages 745-777, June.
    4. Saint-Paul, Gilles, 2021. "Pareto-improving structural reforms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 194(C).
    5. Anton Oleinik, 2011. "Market as a Weapon: Domination by Virtue of a Constellation of Interests," Forum for Social Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 40(2), pages 157-177, January.
    6. Cacciatore, Matteo & Duval, Romain & Fiori, Giuseppe & Ghironi, Fabio, 2016. "Market reforms in the time of imbalance," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 69-93.
    7. Kevin J. Fox & Gilbert Cette & Jimmy Lopez & Jacques Mairesse, 2017. "Upstream Product Market Regulations, ICT, R&D and Productivity," Review of Income and Wealth, International Association for Research in Income and Wealth, vol. 63, pages 68-89, February.
    8. Ahlfeldt, Gabriel M. & Maennig, Wolfgang & Mueller, Steffen Q., 2022. "The generation gap in direct democracy: Age vs. cohort effects," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
    9. Ioannou, Demosthenes & Stracca, Livio, 2014. "Have the euro area and EU governance worked? Just the facts," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 1-17.
    10. Senftleben-König, Charlotte, 2014. "Product Market Deregulation and Employment Outcomes: Evidence from the German Retail Sector," VfS Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100539, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    11. Jacques Pelkmans & Lourdes Acedo Montoya & Alessandro Maravalle, 2008. "How product market reforms lubricate shock adjustment in the euro area," European Economy - Economic Papers 2008 - 2015 341, Directorate General Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN), European Commission.
    12. Johannes Lindvall, 2010. "Power Sharing and Reform Capacity," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 22(3), pages 359-376, July.
    13. Charlotte Senftleben-König, "undated". "Product Market Deregulation and Employment Outcomes: Evidence from the German Retail Sector," BDPEMS Working Papers 2014009, Berlin School of Economics.
    14. Gianluca Misuraca & Giulio Pasi & Fabienne Abadie & Csaba Kucsera & Marco Virginillo, 2017. "Exploring the role of ICT-Enabled Social Innovation to support the modernisation of EU Social Protection Systems: findings and insights from analysis of case studies in fourteen Member States," JRC Research Reports JRC106484, Joint Research Centre.
    15. Senftleben-König, Charlotte, 2014. "Product market deregulation and employment outcomes: Evidence from the German retail sector," SFB 649 Discussion Papers 2014-013, Humboldt University Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649: Economic Risk.
    16. Vincenzo Galasso, 2012. "The Political Feasibility of Postponing Retirement," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 10(04), pages 27-31, December.
    17. Agnello, Luca & Castro, Vitor & Jalles, João Tovar & Sousa, Ricardo M., 2015. "What determines the likelihood of structural reforms?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 129-145.
    18. Stracca, Livio & Ioannou, Demosthenes, 2011. "Have euro area and EU economic governance worked? Just the facts," Working Paper Series 1344, European Central Bank.
    19. Bonatti, Luigi & Fracasso, Andrea, 2019. "Policy inertia, self-defeating expectations and structural reforms: can policy modeling cope?," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 41(5), pages 943-962.
    20. repec:ces:ifodic:v:10:y:2012:i:4:p:19074540 is not listed on IDEAS
    21. Anton Oleinik, 2011. "Market as a Weapon: Domination by Virtue of a Constellation of Interests," Forum for Social Economics, Springer;The Association for Social Economics, vol. 40(2), pages 157-177, July.
    22. Wolfgang Ochel, 2008. "The Political Economy of Two-tier Reforms of Employment Protection in Europe," CESifo Working Paper Series 2461, CESifo.
    23. Beetsma, Roel & Romp, Ward & van Maurik, Ron, 2017. "What Drives Pension Reform Measures in the OECD? Evidence based on a New Comprehensive Dataset and Theory," CEPR Discussion Papers 12313, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

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