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State Banking in Early America: A New Economic History

Author

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  • Bodenhorn, Howard

    (Lafayette College)

Abstract

This manuscript represents the first book-length treatment of early American banking in over 40 years. During that time economic historians have offered new interpretations of several important developments in antebellum American banking practice and policy. Such features of early American financial markets as free banking, branch banking, deposit insurance, and micro-banking have been radically reinterpreted since Redlich and Hammond wrote. Moreover, economic theory has made significant advances, and this manuscript incorporates those theoretical insights into every chapter. The so-called "information-theoretic" approach links the chapters into a unified whole. Early sections of each chapter synthesize the extant research; later sections present extensions, new finding and new interpretations. Available in OSO: http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/oso/public/content/economicsfinance/0195147766/toc.html

Suggested Citation

  • Bodenhorn, Howard, 2002. "State Banking in Early America: A New Economic History," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195147766.
    • Handle: RePEc:oxp:obooks:9780195147766
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Laeven, Luc & Levine, Ross & Michalopoulos, Stelios, 2015. "Financial innovation and endogenous growth," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 1-24.
    2. Bruce G. Carruthers & Naomi R. Lamoreaux, 2016. "Regulatory Races: The Effects of Jurisdictional Competition on Regulatory Standards," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 54(1), pages 52-97, March.
    3. Chad Turner & Robert Tamura & Sean Mulholland, 2013. "How important are human capital, physical capital and total factor productivity for determining state economic growth in the United States, 1840–2000?," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 18(4), pages 319-371, December.
    4. Schwartz, Herman M., 2024. "Triffin reloaded: The matrix of contradictions around global quasi-state money," MPIfG Discussion Paper 24/3, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    5. John Joseph Wallis, 2004. "The Concept of Systematic Corruption in American Political and Economic History," NBER Working Papers 10952, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Stephen Haber, 2008. "Differential Paths of Financial Development: Evidence from New World Economies," NBER Chapters, in: Understanding Long-Run Economic Growth: Geography, Institutions, and the Knowledge Economy, pages 89-120, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Dominique Lacoue-Labarthe, 2003. "L'évolution de la supervision bancaire et de la réglementation prudentielle (1945-1996)," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 73(4), pages 39-63.
    8. Levine, Ross, 2005. "Finance and Growth: Theory and Evidence," Handbook of Economic Growth, in: Philippe Aghion & Steven Durlauf (ed.), Handbook of Economic Growth, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 12, pages 865-934, Elsevier.
    9. Kris James Mitchener & Mari Ohnuki, 2008. "Institutions, Competition, and Capital Market Integration in Japan," IMES Discussion Paper Series 08-E-12, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan.
    10. Wallis, John & Weingast, Barry, 2005. "The Financing of 19th Century Internal Improvements," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt7nh1c6df, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
    11. John Joseph Wallis, 2004. "Constitutions, Corporations, and Corruption: American States and Constitutional Change," NBER Working Papers 10451, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Howard Bodenhorn, 2010. "Federal and State Commercial Banking Policy in the Federalist Era and Beyond," NBER Chapters, in: Founding Choices: American Economic Policy in the 1790s, pages 151-176, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Kris J. Mitchener & Mari Ohnuki, 2008. "Institutions, Competition, and Capital Market Integration in Japan," NBER Working Papers 14090, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    14. Naomi R. Lamoreaux, 2014. "Revisiting American Exceptionalism: Democracy and the Regulation of Corporate Governance in Nineteenth-Century Pennsylvania," NBER Working Papers 20231, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    15. Howard Bodenhorn, 2012. "Voting Rights, Share Concentration, and Leverage at Nineteenth-Century US Banks," NBER Working Papers 17808, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    16. Howard Bodenhorn, 2006. "Bank Chartering and Political Corruption in Antebellum New York. Free Banking as Reform," NBER Chapters, in: Corruption and Reform: Lessons from America's Economic History, pages 231-257, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    17. Cull, Robert & Davis, Lance E. & Lamoreaux, Naomi R. & Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent, 2006. "Historical financing of small- and medium-size enterprises," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 30(11), pages 3017-3042, November.
    18. Raghuram G. Rajan & Rodney Ramcharan, 2008. "Landed Interests and Financial Underdevelopment in the United States," NBER Working Papers 14347, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    19. Myles, Jamieson, 2022. "Trade Acceptances, Financial Reform, and the Culture of Commercial Credit, 1915-1920," Working Papers unige:164262, University of Geneva, Paul Bairoch Institute of Economic History.

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