IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/b/oxp/obooks/9780195139709.html
   My bibliography  Save this book

To Form a More Perfect Union: A New Economic Interpretation of United States Constitution

Author

Listed:
  • McGuire, Robert A.

    (Buchtel College, University of Akron)

Abstract

This is a quantitative reexamination of the behavior of the Founding Fathers during the creation of the United States' Constitution. It employs cliometric analysis, formal economic analysis, and modern statistical techniques, to explain the choices the founders made during the drafting and ratification of the Constitution. These include: What form of government did the founders intend for the Constitution? What factors motivated them to adopt particular clauses in the Constitution? What factors led them to ratify the Constitution? The author argues that the findings challenge the prevailing interpretation of the formation of the Constitution.

Suggested Citation

  • McGuire, Robert A., 2003. "To Form a More Perfect Union: A New Economic Interpretation of United States Constitution," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195139709.
    • Handle: RePEc:oxp:obooks:9780195139709
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Farley Grubb, 2004. "Purchasing Power Parity Across Six British Colonies Versus Across the Same Six U.S. States, 1748-1811," Working Papers 04-05, University of Delaware, Department of Economics.
    2. Ben Baack & Robert A. McGuire & T. Norman Van Cott, 2009. "Constitutional Agreement during the Drafting of the Constitution: A New Interpretation," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 38(2), pages 533-567, June.
    3. Farley W. Grubb, 2005. "State "Currencies" and the Transition to the U.S. Dollar: Reply—Including a New View from Canada," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 1341-1348, September.
    4. Grubb, Farley, 2010. "Testing for the Economic Impact of the U.S. Constitution: Purchasing Power Parity Across the Colonies versus Across the States, 1748–1811," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 70(1), pages 118-145, March.
    5. Mwangi Kimenyi & William Shughart, 2010. "The political economy of constitutional choice: a study of the 2005 Kenyan constitutional referendum," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 21(1), pages 1-27, March.
    6. Sebastian Coll, 2008. "The origins and evolution of democracy: an exercise in history from a constitutional economics approach," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 19(4), pages 313-355, December.
    7. Andrew Smith & Graham Brownlow, 2023. "Informal Institutions as Inhibitors of Rent-Seeking Entrepreneurship: Evidence From U.S. Legal History," Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, , vol. 47(6), pages 2323-2346, November.
    8. Phillip W. Magness & Art Carden & Ilia Murtazashvili, 2023. "Gordon Tullock and the economics of slavery," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 197(1), pages 185-199, October.
    9. Jeffrey Rogers Hummel, 2022. "New Historians and the American Revolution: Are Their Interpretations Really That New?," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 37(Fall 2022), pages 25-37.
    10. Pavlik, Jamie Bologna & Jahan, Israt & Young, Andrew T., 2023. "Do longer constitutions corrupt?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).
    11. Farley Grubb, 2004. "The U.S. Constitution and Monetary Powers: An Analysis of the 1787 Constitutional Convention and How a Constitutional Transformation of the Nation's Monetary System Emerged," Working Papers 04-08, University of Delaware, Department of Economics.
    12. Ruttan, Vernon W., 2007. "Why is Nation Building So Bloody? Two Cases," Staff Papers 7305, University of Minnesota, Department of Applied Economics.
    13. Daron Acemoglu & Suresh Naidu & Pascual Restrepo & James A. Robinson, 2013. "Democracy, Redistribution and Inequality," NBER Working Papers 19746, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oxp:obooks:9780195139709. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Economics Book Marketing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.oup.com/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.