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Anuario iberoamericano de regulación. Vol. II, La regulación en los tiempos del covid

Author

Listed:
  • Luis Ferney Moreno Castillo (director)
  • Luis A. Ortiz Zamora (director)

Abstract

La Asociación Iberoamericana de Regulación (ASIER) presenta a la comunidad académica y profesional el Anuario Iberoamericano de Regulación, Volumen II, dedicado a "La regulación en los tiempos del COVID". En esta edición han participado autores de países como Argentina, Brasil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, Ecuador, México y Perú. ASIER está integrada por un grupo de profesionales de diversos países de Iberoamérica, vinculados a la regulación económica de los sectores estratégicos. Es una entidad plurinacional académica, de tipo asociativo, abierta a todos los interesados en el conocimiento y desarrollo de los mecanismos jurídicos, técnicos y económicos implicados en la regulación, la gestión y el control de los grandes sectores que sostienen la dinámica de vida de los países. En consecuencia, esta obra analiza el impacto del COVID en los diferentes sectores regulados de Iberoamérica, como energía, infraestructura, servicios públicos, entre otros.

Suggested Citation

  • Luis Ferney Moreno Castillo (director) & Luis A. Ortiz Zamora (director), 2022. "Anuario iberoamericano de regulación. Vol. II, La regulación en los tiempos del covid," Books, Universidad Externado de Colombia, Facultad de Derecho, number 1361, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:ext:derech:1361
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    4. Rafaela Sayas Contreras & Viviana de Jesús Martelo Angulo, 2012. "Aspectos regulatorios del consumo en Colombia: Autoridades y responsabilidades," Revista Saber, Ciencia y Libertad, Universidad Libre - Sede Cartagena, vol. 7(2), pages 53-61, July.
    5. George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
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