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Contracting with costly tenants

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  • Hubert, Franz

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  • Hubert, Franz, 1995. "Contracting with costly tenants," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(5), pages 631-654, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:regeco:v:25:y:1995:i:5:p:631-654
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Schlicht, Ekkehart, 1981. "The Tenant’s Decreasing Willingness to Pay and the Rent Abatement Phenomen," Publications of Darmstadt Technical University, Institute for Business Studies (BWL) 39248, Darmstadt Technical University, Department of Business Administration, Economics and Law, Institute for Business Studies (BWL).
    2. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1983. "Incentive Effects of Terminations: Applications to the Credit and Labor Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(5), pages 912-927, December.
    3. Riley, John G, 1979. "Informational Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(2), pages 331-359, March.
    4. Kanemoto, Yoshitsugu, 1990. "Contract types in the property market," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 5-22, June.
    5. J.R. Miron, 1990. "Security of Tenure, Costly Tenants and Rent Regulation," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, vol. 27(2), pages 167-183, April.
    6. Holmstrom, Bengt & Myerson, Roger B, 1983. "Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(6), pages 1799-1819, November.
    7. Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 90(4), pages 629-649.
    8. Caplin, Andrew & Nalebuff, Barry, 1991. "Aggregation and Imperfect Competition: On the Existence of Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(1), pages 25-59, January.
    9. Wilson, Charles, 1977. "A model of insurance markets with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 167-207, December.
    10. Allen C. Goodman & Masahiro Kawai, 1985. "Length-of-Residence Discounts and Rental Housing Demand: Theory and Evidence," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 62(2), pages 93-105.
    11. Michael Waldman, 1984. "Job Assignments, Signalling, and Efficiency," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(2), pages 255-267, Summer.
    12. Bruce C. Greenwald, 1986. "Adverse Selection in the Labour Market," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 53(3), pages 325-347.
    13. Guasch, J. Luis & Marshall, Robert C., 1987. "A theoretical and empirical analysis of the length of residency discount in the rental housing market," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 291-311, November.
    14. George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
    15. Smith Freeman, 1977. "Wage Trends as Performance Displays Productive Potential: A Model and Application to Academic Early Retirement," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 8(2), pages 419-443, Autumn.
    16. Spence, Michael, 1974. "Competitive and optimal responses to signals: An analysis of efficiency and distribution," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 296-332, March.
    17. Homburg, Stefan, 1993. "An Analysis of the German Tenant Protection Law," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 149(2), pages 464-474.
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