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Money, Sex and Broken Promises: Politicians’ Bad Behaviour Reduces Trust

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  • Rose, Richard
  • Weßels, Bernhard

Abstract

This article develops and tests empirically a theory of the effect on political trust of forms of behaviour that violate social, political and legal norms about how politicians ought to behave. These include taking money for favours, over-indulging in private life and making misleading promises to win votes. The evidence comes from a specially designed survey in Britain, France and Spain, countries where popular distrust of politicians appears greater than illegal political behaviour. Bad behaviours, especially abandoning election promises once in office, have a much stronger effect on distrust of political parties that do differences in partisanship. Comparing national regressions shows that the impact of bad behaviours is very similar in Britain, France and Spain.

Suggested Citation

  • Rose, Richard & Weßels, Bernhard, 2019. "Money, Sex and Broken Promises: Politicians’ Bad Behaviour Reduces Trust," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 72(3), pages 481-500.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:espost:180852
    DOI: 10.1093/pa/gsy024
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kumlin, Staffan & Esaiasson, Peter, 2012. "Scandal Fatigue? Scandal Elections and Satisfaction with Democracy in Western Europe, 1977–2007," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 42(2), pages 263-282, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. V. P. Kirilenko & G. V. Alekseev, 2021. "Measuring Political Trust in a Modern Democracy," Administrative Consulting, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration. North-West Institute of Management., issue 10.
    2. N. A. Mozumder, 2022. "Can Ethical Political Leadership Restore Public Trust in Political Leaders?," Public Organization Review, Springer, vol. 22(3), pages 821-835, September.
    3. Petrarca, Constanza Sanhueza & Giebler, Heiko & Weßels, Bernhard, 2022. "Support for insider parties: The role of political trust in a longitudinal-comparative perspective," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 28(2), pages 329-341.

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