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The Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program: A Systemwide Systemic Risk Exception

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Abstract

In the fall of 2008, short-term credit markets were all but frozen, creating liquidity issues for banks and bank holding companies that could not rollover their debt at reasonable rates. Fearing that the situation would worsen if something was not done, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the Federal Reserve Board invoked, and the Secretary of the Treasury approved, the use of the "systemic risk exception" (SRE) under the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, to provide unprecedented broad-based relief to struggling banks. The SRE permitted the FDIC to depart from its "least-cost" requirement when addressing failing banks. Under the auspices of the SRE, the FDIC implemented two programs: (1) the Debt Guarantee Program (DGP), which extended the FDIC's guarantee to newly issued debt instruments of FDIC-insured institutions, their holding companies, and their eligible affiliates; and (2) the Transaction Account Guarantee Program (TAGP), which provided unlimited deposit insurance coverage of non-interest-bearing transaction accounts. The DGP and TAGP were integral parts of a broad government response to systemic risk in the banking system and are considered successful elements thereof. Under the DGP, at peak usage, the FDIC guaranteed approximately $350 billion in newly issued bank debt. Under the TAGP, at peak usage, the FDIC guaranteed approximately $800 billion in non-interest-bearing transaction accounts at participating banks, offering for the first-time insurance over the statutory amount. The fees collected for the programs exceeded any losses covered by the government.

Suggested Citation

  • Davison, Lee, 2019. "The Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program: A Systemwide Systemic Risk Exception," Journal of Financial Crises, Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS), vol. 1(2), pages 1-39, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:ysm:ypfsfc:1211
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Fabio Panetta & Thomas Faeh & Giuseppe Grande & Corrinne Ho & Michael R King & Aviram Levy & Federico M Signoretti & Marco Taboga & Andrea Zaghini, 2009. "An assessment of financial sector rescue programmes," BIS Papers, Bank for International Settlements, number 48.
    2. Sebastian Schich, 2009. "Expanded government guarantees for bank liabilities: Selected issues," OECD Journal: Financial Market Trends, OECD Publishing, vol. 2009(1), pages 89-123.
    3. Aviram Levy & Sebastian Schich, 2010. "The Design of Government Guarantees for Bank Bonds: Lessons from the Recent Financial Crisis," OECD Journal: Financial Market Trends, OECD Publishing, vol. 2010(1), pages 35-66.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    FDIC; TLGP; Global Financial Crisis; Systemic Risk; DGP; TAGP; Federal Reserve;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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