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Does Stock Misvaluation Differentiate the Motives for Takeovers?

Author

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  • Yi-Cheng Shih

    (Department of Finance, National Taiwan University, 106 Taipei, Taiwan)

  • Bai-Jia Hsu

    (Department of Finance, National Taiwan University, 106 Taipei, Taiwan)

Abstract

We use pre-offer market valuations to examine the motives for takeovers under the misvaluation theory. According to previous literature, the motives for merger and acquisition consist of synergy, agency and hubris. We find that overvalued acquirers paying by cash have the motives of synergy and hubris. However, overvalued acquirers paying by stock have the motives of agency and hubris. On the other hand, the motive of undervalued acquirers paying by cash is only hubris. Lastly, the motives of those undervalued acquirers paying by stock are synergy and hubris. In this study, we provide the empirical evidence to show that acquirers' stock misevaluation and their payment methods will differentiate the motives for takeovers.

Suggested Citation

  • Yi-Cheng Shih & Bai-Jia Hsu, 2009. "Does Stock Misvaluation Differentiate the Motives for Takeovers?," Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies (RPBFMP), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 12(03), pages 545-566.
    • Handle: RePEc:wsi:rpbfmp:v:12:y:2009:i:03:n:s0219091509001745
    DOI: 10.1142/S0219091509001745
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Sapienza, Paola & Polk, Christopher, 2003. "The Real Effects of Investor Sentiment," CEPR Discussion Papers 3826, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Bengt Holmstrom & Steven N. Kaplan, 2001. "Corporate Governance and Merger Activity in the United States: Making Sense of the 1980s and 1990s," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 15(2), pages 121-144, Spring.
    3. Bengt Holmstrom & Steven N. Kaplan, 2001. "Corporate Governance and Merger Activity in the U.S.: Making Sense of the 1980s and 1990s," NBER Working Papers 8220, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Tatyana Sokolyk, 2015. "Governance provisions and managerial entrenchment: evidence from CEO turnover of acquiring firms," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 45(2), pages 305-335, August.
    2. Mehrez Ben Slama & Dhafer Saidane & Hassouna Fedhila, 2012. "How to identify targets in the M&A banking operations? Case of cross-border strategies in Europe by line of activity," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 38(2), pages 209-240, February.
    3. Shaomeng Li & Guy S. Liu & Andros Gregoriou, 2021. "Do more mergers and acquisitions create value for shareholders?," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 56(2), pages 755-787, February.
    4. Adel Bino & Elisabeta Pana, 2011. "Firm value and investment policy around stock for stock mergers," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 37(2), pages 207-221, August.
    5. Surendranath Jory & Thanh Ngo & Jurica Susnjara, 2020. "Stock mergers and acquirers’ subsequent stock price crash risk," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 54(1), pages 359-387, January.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Misvaluation; merger and acquisition motivation; synergy; agency and hubris motives;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G1 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets
    • G2 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services
    • G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance

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