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Passive Institutions and Long-Run CEO Compensation: Evidence from Proxy Voting

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  • In Ji Jang

    (Department of Finance, Bentley University, 175 Forest Street, Waltham, MA 02452-4705, USA)

Abstract

A one-standard-deviation increase in passive ownership leads to a 25% increase in the compensation duration. I find proxy voting is the channel through which passive investors affect incentive horizons. Since the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, passive funds tend to vote more against Say-on-Pay (SOP) proposals, and SOP proposals are less likely to pass with higher passive ownership. Moreover, passive ownership is associated with a greater number of shareholder-sponsored compensation proposals and an increased likelihood of these proposals passing. The overall findings indicate that passive institutions work to lengthen CEO compensation to align incentive horizons, and proxy voting is the mechanism through which they exert influence.

Suggested Citation

  • In Ji Jang, 2024. "Passive Institutions and Long-Run CEO Compensation: Evidence from Proxy Voting," Quarterly Journal of Finance (QJF), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 14(03), pages 1-64, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:wsi:qjfxxx:v:14:y:2024:i:03:n:s2010139224500083
    DOI: 10.1142/S2010139224500083
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Passive funds; incentive horizons; proxy voting; institutional investors;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation

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