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Games with Costly Winnings

Author

Listed:
  • Irit Nowik

    (Department of Industrial Engineering and Management, Lev Academic Center, P.O. Box 16031, Jerusalem 9116001, Israel)

  • Tahl Nowik

    (��Department of Mathematics, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat-Gan 5290002, Israel)

Abstract

We introduce a new sequential game, where each player has a limited resource that he needs to spend on increasing the probability of winning each stage, but also on maintaining the assets that he has won in the previous stages. Thus, the players’ strategies must take into account that winning at any given stage negatively affects the chances of winning in later stages. Whenever the initial resources of the players are not too small, we present explicit strategies for the players, and show that they are a Nash equilibrium, which is unique in an appropriate sense.

Suggested Citation

  • Irit Nowik & Tahl Nowik, 2017. "Games with Costly Winnings," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 19(04), pages 1-9, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:19:y:2017:i:04:n:s0219198917500165
    DOI: 10.1142/S0219198917500165
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    References listed on IDEAS

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