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Understanding the Other Through Social Roles

Author

Listed:
  • Mamoru Kaneko

    (Faculty of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University, 1-6-1, Nishi-Waseda, Shinjuku, Tokyo 169-8050, Japan)

  • J. Jude Kline

    (School of Economics, University of Queensland, Brisbane, QLD 4072, Australia)

Abstract

Inductive game theory has been developed to explore the origin of beliefs of a person from his accumulated experiences of a game situation. It has been restricted to a person's view of the structure not including another person's thoughts. In this paper, we explore the experiential origin of one's view of the other's beliefs about the game situation, especially about the other's payoffs. We restrict our exploration to a 2-role (strategic) game, which has been recurrently played by two people with occasional role-switching. Each person accumulates experiences of both roles, and these experiences become the source for his transpersonal view about the other. Reciprocity in the sense of role-switching is crucial for deriving his own and the other's beliefs. We also consider how a person can use these views for his behavior revision, and we define an equilibrium called anintrapersonal coordination equilibrium. Based on this, we show that cooperation will emerge as the degree of reciprocity increases.

Suggested Citation

  • Mamoru Kaneko & J. Jude Kline, 2015. "Understanding the Other Through Social Roles," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 17(01), pages 1-31.
    • Handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:17:y:2015:i:01:n:s0219198915400058
    DOI: 10.1142/S0219198915400058
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1994. "A Course in Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262650401, April.
    2. Mamoru Kaneko & Akihiko Matsui, 1999. "Inductive Game Theory: Discrimination and Prejudices," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 1(1), pages 101-137, January.
    3. repec:bla:jpbect:v:1:y:1999:i:1:p:101-37 is not listed on IDEAS
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Masao Ogaki, 2022. "Economics of the community mechanism," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, vol. 73(3), pages 433-457, July.
    2. Mamoru Kaneko, 2020. "Expected utility theory with probability grids and preference formation," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 70(3), pages 723-764, October.
    3. Mamoru Kaneko, 2019. "Expected Utility Theory with Probability Grids and Preference Formation," Working Papers 1902, Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics.
    4. Mamoru Kaneko & Shuige Liu, 2015. "Elimination of dominated strategies and inessential players," Operations Research and Decisions, Wroclaw University of Science and Technology, Faculty of Management, vol. 25(1), pages 33-54.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Inductive game theory; role-switching; reciprocity; strategic game; C70; D80;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B4 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology
    • C0 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General
    • C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D5 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • M2 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics

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