IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/wsi/igtrxx/v12y2010i03ns0219198910002660.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The Extended Core Of A Cooperative Ntu Game

Author

Listed:
  • HANS KEIDING

    (Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, Øster Farimagsgade 5, DK-1353 Copenhagen K, Denmark)

  • YAROSLAVNA PANKRATOVA

    (Department of Mathematical Methods of Economic Research, International Banking Institute, Nevskii pr. 60, 191011 Saint-Petersburg, Russia)

Abstract

In this paper we propose an extension of the core of NTU games from its domain to a larger set of games satisfying a few conditions of well-behavedness. The solution concept is a rather straightforward generalization of the extended core of TU games introduced by Gomez [2003] and is shown to have similar properties. Also, a set of axioms for solutions of NTU games is presented which characterizes the extended core.

Suggested Citation

  • Hans Keiding & Yaroslavna Pankratova, 2010. "The Extended Core Of A Cooperative Ntu Game," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 12(03), pages 263-274.
    • Handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:12:y:2010:i:03:n:s0219198910002660
    DOI: 10.1142/S0219198910002660
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/S0219198910002660
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1142/S0219198910002660?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Juan Camilo Gómez, 2003. "An Extension of the Core solution Concept," Discussion Papers 04-01, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
    2. Keiding, Hans, 1986. "An axiomatization of the core of a cooperative game," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 111-115.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Camelia Bejan & Juan Gómez, 2012. "Axiomatizing core extensions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 41(4), pages 885-898, November.
    2. Vincent Iehlé, 2004. "Transfer rate rules and core selections in NTU games," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(42), pages 1-10.
    3. Camelia Bejan & Juan Camilo Gómez & Anne van den Nouweland, 2022. "On the importance of reduced games in axiomatizing core extensions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 59(3), pages 637-668, October.
    4. Bejan, Camelia & Gómez, Juan Camilo & van den Nouweland, Anne, 2021. "Feasibility-free axiomatization of the core and its non-empty extension," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 201(C).
    5. Anindya Bhattacharya, 2022. "A look back at the core of games in characteristic function form: some new axiomatization results," Papers 2208.01690, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2024.
    6. Francesc Llerena & Carles Rafels, 2007. "Convex decomposition of games and axiomatizations of the core and the D-core," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 35(4), pages 603-615, April.
    7. Ata Atay & Francesc Llerena & Marina Núñez, 2016. "Generalized three-sided assignment markets: core consistency and competitive prices," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 24(3), pages 572-593, October.
    8. Francesc Llerena & Carles Rafels, 2005. "On reasonable outcomes and the core in cooperative TU games," Working Papers 160, Barcelona School of Economics.
    9. Llerena, Francesc, 2007. "An axiomatization of the core of games with restricted cooperation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 95(1), pages 80-84, April.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Cooperative games; NTU games; extensive core; axiomatization; 22E46; 53C35; 57S20;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B4 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology
    • C0 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General
    • C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D5 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • M2 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:12:y:2010:i:03:n:s0219198910002660. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Tai Tone Lim (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.worldscinet.com/igtr/igtr.shtml .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.