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Generalized three-sided assignment markets: core consistency and competitive prices

Author

Listed:
  • Ata Atay

    (Universitat de Barcelona)

  • Francesc Llerena

    (Universitat Rovira i Virgili-CREIP)

  • Marina Núñez

    (Universitat de Barcelona)

Abstract

A generalization of the classical three-sided assignment market is considered, where value is generated by pairs or triplets of agents belonging to different sectors, as well as by individuals. For these markets we represent the situation that arises when some agents leave the market with some payoff by means of a generalization of Owen (Ann Econ Stat 25–26:71–79, 1992) derived market. Consistency with respect to the derived market, together with singleness best and individual anti-monotonicity, axiomatically characterize the core for these generalized three-sided assignment markets. When one sector is formed by buyers and the other by two different type of sellers, we show that the core coincides with the set of competitive equilibrium payoff vectors.

Suggested Citation

  • Ata Atay & Francesc Llerena & Marina Núñez, 2016. "Generalized three-sided assignment markets: core consistency and competitive prices," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 24(3), pages 572-593, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:topjnl:v:24:y:2016:i:3:d:10.1007_s11750-016-0409-0
    DOI: 10.1007/s11750-016-0409-0
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    8. Guillermo Owen, 1992. "The Assignment Game : The Reduced Game," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 25-26, pages 71-79.
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    Cited by:

    1. Streekstra, Leanne & Trudeau, Christian, 2020. "Stable source connection and assignment problems as multi-period shortest path problems," Discussion Papers on Economics 7/2020, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Economics.
    2. Ata Atay & Eric Bahel & Tamás Solymosi, 2023. "Matching markets with middlemen under transferable utility," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 322(2), pages 539-563, March.
    3. Ata Atay & Marina Núñez, 2019. "Multi-sided assignment games on m-partite graphs," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 279(1), pages 271-290, August.

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