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Manager, Worker, Rentier And Government: Markov And Non-Markovian Play

Author

Listed:
  • ROMAR CORREA

    (Department of Economics,University of Mumbai, Vidyanagari, Mumbai 400 098, India)

Abstract

We decompose the representative agent into her manager, worker and rentier selves. The criterion is the information set of each of the 'incarnations' at every stage of a repeated game. The rentier's information set includes anticipating information while the information set of the other agents is feedback. The equilibrium that results is, therefore, not subgame perfect. Enter the government that produces a good that complements the existing good. It is financed by the issue of money that substitutes for the asset. The enlargement of the state space of the game induces cooperation between the agents.

Suggested Citation

  • Romar Correa, 2006. "Manager, Worker, Rentier And Government: Markov And Non-Markovian Play," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 8(03), pages 429-436.
    • Handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:08:y:2006:i:03:n:s0219198906001004
    DOI: 10.1142/S0219198906001004
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Dockner,Engelbert J. & Jorgensen,Steffen & Long,Ngo Van & Sorger,Gerhard, 2000. "Differential Games in Economics and Management Science," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521637329, September.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Markov and non-Markovian equilibrium; coordination games; JEL Classification Number: C73; JEL Classification Number: E13;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B4 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology
    • C0 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General
    • C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D5 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • M2 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics

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