Formalization Of Multi-Level Games
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198904000150
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References listed on IDEAS
- Jean Tirole, 1988. "The Theory of Industrial Organization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262200716, December.
- Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414, December.
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- Hausken, Kjell, 2006. "Jack Hirshleifer: A Nobel Prize left unbestowed," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 251-276, June.
- Fenling Feng & Chengguang Liu & Jiaqi Zhang, 2020. "China's Railway Transportation Safety Regulation System Based on Evolutionary Game Theory and System Dynamics," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 40(10), pages 1944-1966, October.
- Tverskoi, Denis & Senthilnathan, Athmanathan & Gavrilets, Sergey, 2021. "The dynamics of cooperation, power, and inequality in a group-structured society," SocArXiv 24svr_v1, Center for Open Science.
- Tverskoi, Denis & Senthilnathan, Athmanathan & Gavrilets, Sergey, 2021. "The dynamics of cooperation, power, and inequality in a group-structured society," SocArXiv 24svr, Center for Open Science.
- Kjell Hausken, 2016. "Gordon Tullock: A Nobel Prize left unbestowed," Journal of Bioeconomics, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 121-127, July.
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More about this item
Keywords
Multilevel game theory; methodological individualism; empowerment from below; multilevel Nash equilibrium; JEL Classification Number C79;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- B4 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology
- C0 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General
- C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- D5 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
- M2 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics
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