IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/wly/soecon/v69y2002i2p479-486.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Effects of Job Security Laws in a Shirking Model with Heterogeneous Workers

Author

Listed:
  • Chung‐cheng Lin

Abstract

This paper explores the policy implications of job security laws. It extends Carter and De Lancey's (1997) efficiency wage model from the assumption of two types of workers to allow for infinite types of workers. One key difference between the models is that the proportion of nonshirking workers in equilibrium is an exogenous constant in their model, whereas it is an endogenous variable in this study. They find that a job security law increases the welfare of both shirkers and non‐shirkers without reducing output. In this setting, it is shown that the law may increase the welfare of both shirkers and nonshirkers at the cost of lower output, or it may result in higher output, but the welfare effect of workers is uncertain.

Suggested Citation

  • Chung‐cheng Lin, 2002. "Effects of Job Security Laws in a Shirking Model with Heterogeneous Workers," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 69(2), pages 479-486, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:soecon:v:69:y:2002:i:2:p:479-486
    DOI: 10.1002/j.2325-8012.2002.tb00505.x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1002/j.2325-8012.2002.tb00505.x
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1002/j.2325-8012.2002.tb00505.x?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Strand, Jon, 1987. "Unemployment as a Discipline Device with Heterogeneous Labor [Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device]," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(3), pages 489-493, June.
    2. Levine, David I, 1989. "Just-Cause Employment Policies When Unemployment Is a Worker Discipline Device," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(4), pages 902-905, September.
    3. Groenewold, Nicolaas, 1999. "Employment Protection and Aggregate Unemployment," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 619-630, July.
    4. Shapiro, Carl & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1984. "Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 433-444, June.
    5. Sjostrom, William, 1993. "Job security in an efficiency wage model," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 183-187.
    6. Carter, Thomas J. & De Lancey, Paul R., 1997. "Just, Unjust, and Just-Cause Dismissals," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 619-628, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Huang, Chun-chieh & Chang, Juin-jen & Lai, Ching-chong, 2009. "Employment effect of dismissal pay in the presence of judicial mistakes," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 38-45, March.
    2. Lin, Chung-cheng, 2004. "Bonding, shirking and adverse selection," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 545-560, May.
    3. Rebitzer, James B & Taylor, Lowell J, 1995. "Do Labor Markets Provide Enough Short-Hour Jobs? An Analysis of Work Hours and Work Incentives," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 33(2), pages 257-273, April.
    4. Sergei Hoxha & Alfred Kleinknecht, 2024. "When structural reforms of labor markets harm productivity. Evidence from the German IAB panel," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press and the Associazione ICC, vol. 33(3), pages 541-554.
    5. Bradley T. Ewing & James E. Payne, 1999. "The Trade‐Off Between Supervision and Wages: Evidence of Efficiency Wages from the NLSY," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 66(2), pages 424-432, October.
    6. Lin, Chung-cheng & Yang, C.C., 2008. "The firm as a community explaining asymmetric behavior and downward rigidity of wages," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 390-400, November.
    7. Strand, J., 1998. "Bargaining Versus Efficiency Wages in a Dynamic Labor Market: A Synthesis," Memorandum 22/1998, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
    8. Ose, Solveig Osborg, 2005. "Working conditions, compensation and absenteeism," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 161-188, January.
    9. Groenewold, Nicolaas, 1999. "Employment Protection and Aggregate Unemployment," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 619-630, July.
    10. Matthews, Peter Hans, 1996. "A brief note on the macroeconomic consequences of random production failures," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 411-415.
    11. Lin, Chung-cheng & Chang, Juin-jen & Lai, Ching-chong, 2002. "Profit sharing as a worker discipline device," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 19(5), pages 815-828, November.
    12. Chang, Juin-jen & Lai, Ching-chong, 1999. "Carrots or sticks? A social custom viewpoint on worker effort," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 297-310, June.
    13. Cahill, Miles B., 2000. "Exploring the interaction between efficiency wages and labor market frictions," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 121-137.
    14. repec:eee:labchp:v:3:y:1999:i:pb:p:2291-2372 is not listed on IDEAS
    15. Chung-cheng Lin & C.C. Yang, 2006. "The Firm as a Community Explaining Asymmetric Behavior and Downward Rigidity of Wages," IEAS Working Paper : academic research 06-A014, Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan.
    16. Peter Hans Matthews, 2005. "Labor Discipline, Reputation and Underemployment Traps," Middlebury College Working Paper Series 0501, Middlebury College, Department of Economics.
    17. Lloyd Ulman, 1992. "Why Should Human Resource Managers Pay High Wages?," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 30(2), pages 177-212, June.
    18. Kee, Hiau Looi & Hoon, Hian Teck, 2005. "Trade, capital accumulation and structural unemployment: an empirical study of the Singapore economy," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 125-152, June.
    19. Sonja Daltung & Vittoria Cerasi, 2006. "Financial structure, managerial compensation and monitoring," FMG Discussion Papers dp576, Financial Markets Group.
    20. José Abraham López Machuca & Jorge Eduardo Mendoza Cota, 2017. "Salarios, desempleo y productividad laboral en la industria manufacturera mexicana. (Wage, Unemployment and Labor Productivity in the Mexican Manufacturing Industry)," Ensayos Revista de Economia, Universidad Autonoma de Nuevo Leon, Facultad de Economia, vol. 0(2), pages 185-228, October.
    21. Kugler, Adriana & Kugler, Maurice, 2003. "The labor market effects of payroll taxes in a middle-income country: evidence from Colombia," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 0306, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wly:soecon:v:69:y:2002:i:2:p:479-486. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://doi.org/10.1002/(ISSN)2325-8012 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.