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The Future of Market Regulation

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  • Roger Sherman

Abstract

Market regulation is accomplished both by competition and by external government agencies, and the trend is toward greater reliance on competition. Economists have fostered this trend and have even invented markets to help overcome some externality problems. They have contributed to a steady improvement in antitrust policy, which currently reflects economic knowledge well. They diagnosed and demonstrated problems with external regulation of the airline industry and gave assurance that regulation by competition could work in its place. Success there led not only to deregulation of airlines but also deregulation of railroads, trucks, buses, and, in some ways, natural gas pipelines. Two other industries, telecommunications and electricity, are now following very ambitious paths toward less external regulation and greater dependence on competition. The Internet raises new issues, but there also, competition will play an important regulatory role.

Suggested Citation

  • Roger Sherman, 2001. "The Future of Market Regulation," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 67(4), pages 782-800, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:soecon:v:67:y:2001:i:4:p:782-800
    DOI: 10.1002/j.2325-8012.2001.tb00374.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Keller, Jann T. & Kuper, Gerard H. & Mulder, Machiel, 2022. "Challenging natural monopolies: Assessing market power of gas transmission system operators for cross-border capacity," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 170(C).

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