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Direct Vertical Integration Strategies

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  • James L. Hamilton
  • Ibrahim M. Mqasqas

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Suggested Citation

  • James L. Hamilton & Ibrahim M. Mqasqas, 1997. "Direct Vertical Integration Strategies," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 64(1), pages 220-234, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:soecon:v:64:y:1997:i:1:p:220-234
    DOI: 10.1002/j.2325-8012.1997.tb00016.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jean Tirole, 1988. "The Theory of Industrial Organization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262200716, December.
    2. Patrick Rey & Joseph Stiglitz, 1995. "The Role of Exclusive Territories in Producers' Competition," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(3), pages 431-451, Autumn.
    3. Reiffen, David, 1992. "Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(3), pages 694-697, June.
    4. Lin, Y Joseph, 1988. "Oligopoly and Vertical Integration: Note," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(1), pages 251-254, March.
    5. Ordover, Janusz A & Saloner, Garth & Salop, Steven C, 1992. "Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure: Reply," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(3), pages 698-703, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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