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The relationship between regulation and contracts in infrastructure industries: Regulation as ordered renegotiation

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  • Jon Stern

Abstract

This paper discusses the relationship between regulation and contracts in infrastructure industries and the role of regulation, particularly the role of regulatory agencies in the review, revision, and renegotiation of contracts. The paper starts with a short survey of relevant economic and legal issues. Examples are presented of how and why infrastructure contracts, including concession contracts, have been combined with monitoring and enforcement by external regulatory agencies. The examples discussed include historical UK experience, recent French experience, and developing country experience. The paper concludes with a discussion of the role that regulatory entities can play to reinforce trust and sustain contracts by enabling simpler contracts, resolving contract misunderstandings, and providing processes for ordered renegotiations.

Suggested Citation

  • Jon Stern, 2012. "The relationship between regulation and contracts in infrastructure industries: Regulation as ordered renegotiation," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 6(4), pages 474-498, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:reggov:v:6:y:2012:i:4:p:474-498
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1748-5991.2012.01141.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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