IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/wly/reggov/v13y2019i3p405-430.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Perils of development funding? The tale of EU Funds and grand corruption in Central and Eastern Europe

Author

Listed:
  • Mihály Fazekas
  • Lawrence Peter King

Abstract

Given the unprecedented scale of intergovernmental development funding and the importance of institutional quality for human well‐being, it is imperative to precisely understand the impact of development funds on corruption. In Europe, European Union (EU) Funds provide a boost to public spending in recipient member states while introducing additional corruption controls. We investigate whether EU Funds increase high‐level corruption in the Czech Republic and Hungary in 2009–2012. We analyze newly collected data from over 100,000 public procurement contracts to develop objective corruption risk indicators and link them to agency level data in the public sector. Propensity score matching estimations suggest that EU funds increase corruption risk by up to 34 percent. The negative effects are largely attributable to overly formalistic compliance and EU Funds overriding domestic accountability mechanisms in public organizations entirely dependent on external funds. The policy implications are profound: governments should reduce barriers to market entry by lowering red tape and prevent excessive concentration of funds.

Suggested Citation

  • Mihály Fazekas & Lawrence Peter King, 2019. "Perils of development funding? The tale of EU Funds and grand corruption in Central and Eastern Europe," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 13(3), pages 405-430, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:reggov:v:13:y:2019:i:3:p:405-430
    DOI: 10.1111/rego.12184
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12184
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/rego.12184?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Sean Lewis-Faupel & Yusuf Neggers & Benjamin A. Olken & Rohini Pande, 2016. "Can Electronic Procurement Improve Infrastructure Provision? Evidence from Public Works in India and Indonesia," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 8(3), pages 258-283, August.
    2. Ishii, Rieko, 2009. "Favor exchange in collusion: Empirical study of repeated procurement auctions in Japan," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 137-144, March.
    3. Jan SOudek & Jiri Skuhrovec, 2013. "Public Procurement of Homogeneous Goods: the Czech Republic Case Study," Working Papers IES 2013/05, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised May 2013.
    4. Knack, Stephen & Rahman, Aminur, 2007. "Donor fragmentation and bureaucratic quality in aid recipients," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(1), pages 176-197, May.
    5. Simeon Djankov & Jose Montalvo & Marta Reynal-Querol, 2008. "The curse of aid," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 169-194, September.
    6. Stephen Knack, 2001. "Aid Dependence and the Quality of Governance: Cross-Country Empirical Tests," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 68(2), pages 310-329, October.
    7. Guido W. Imbens & Jeffrey M. Wooldridge, 2009. "Recent Developments in the Econometrics of Program Evaluation," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 47(1), pages 5-86, March.
    8. North,Douglass C. & Wallis,John Joseph & Weingast,Barry R., 2013. "Violence and Social Orders," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107646995.
    9. Duvanova, Dinissa, 2014. "Economic Regulations, Red Tape, and Bureaucratic Corruption in Post-Communist Economies," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 298-312.
    10. Mauro, Paolo, 1998. "Corruption and the composition of government expenditure," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 263-279, June.
    11. Coviello, Decio & Gagliarducci, Stefano, 2010. "Building Political Collusion: Evidence from Procurement Auctions," IZA Discussion Papers 4939, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    12. Charles Kenny & Maria Musatova, 2011. "‘Red Flags of Corruption’ in World Bank Projects: An Analysis of Infrastructure Contracts," Chapters, in: Susan Rose-Ackerman & Tina Søreide (ed.), International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption, Volume Two, chapter 18, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Alexander Katsaitis, 2023. "Introducing the PFxEU tracker dataset: Tracking political financing in the European Union," European Union Politics, , vol. 24(4), pages 785-796, December.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Broich, Tobias & Szirmai, Adam & Thomsson, Kaj, 2015. "Precolonial centralisation, foreign aid and modern state capacity in Africa," MERIT Working Papers 2015-025, United Nations University - Maastricht Economic and Social Research Institute on Innovation and Technology (MERIT).
    2. Balázs Szent-Iványi, 2015. "Are Democratising Countries Rewarded with Higher Levels of Foreign Aid?," Acta Oeconomica, Akadémiai Kiadó, Hungary, vol. 65(4), pages 593-615, December.
    3. Thierry Kangoye, 2008. "Instability from trade and democracy: the long-run effect of aid," Post-Print hal-00331902, HAL.
    4. Temple, Jonathan R.W., 2010. "Aid and Conditionality," Handbook of Development Economics, in: Dani Rodrik & Mark Rosenzweig (ed.), Handbook of Development Economics, edition 1, volume 5, chapter 0, pages 4415-4523, Elsevier.
    5. Asongu Simplice & Jellal Mohamed, 2014. "International aid, corruption and fiscal policy behavior," Working Papers of the African Governance and Development Institute. 14/007, African Governance and Development Institute..
    6. Karim Khan, 2015. "Endogenous Institutional Change and Privileged Groups," The Pakistan Development Review, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, vol. 54(3), pages 171-195.
    7. Easterly, William & Williamson, Claudia R., 2011. "Rhetoric versus Reality: The Best and Worst of Aid Agency Practices," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 39(11), pages 1930-1949.
    8. repec:elg:eechap:15325_15 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Jones, Sam & Tarp, Finn, 2016. "Does foreign aid harm political institutions?," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 266-281.
    10. Karim Khan & Saima Batool & Anwar Shah, 2016. "Authoritarian Regimes and Economic Development: An Empirical Reflection," The Pakistan Development Review, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, vol. 55(4), pages 657-673.
    11. Gans-Morse, Jordan & Borges, Mariana & Makarin, Alexey & Mannah-Blankson, Theresa & Nickow, Andre & Zhang, Dong, 2018. "Reducing bureaucratic corruption: Interdisciplinary perspectives on what works," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 171-188.
    12. Zohid Askarov & Hristos Doucouliagos, 2013. "Does aid improve democracy and governance? A meta-regression analysis," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 157(3), pages 601-628, December.
    13. Molenaers, Nadia & Dellepiane, Sebastian & Faust, Jorg, 2015. "Political Conditionality and Foreign Aid," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 2-12.
    14. Jones, Sam & Tarp, Finn, 2016. "Does foreign aid harm political institutions?," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 266-281.
    15. Thierry Kangoye, 2011. "On the potential of foreign aid to protect democracy against instability from trade," CERDI Working papers halshs-00556697, HAL.
    16. Thierry Somlawende KANGOYE, 2008. "On the potential of foreign aid to protect democracy against instability from trade," Working Papers 200821, CERDI.
    17. Asongu, Simplice & Jellal, Mohamed, 2014. "International aid corruption and fiscal behavior policy," MPRA Paper 57192, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    18. Hagen, Rune Jansen, 2014. "Rents and the Political Economy of Development Aid," Working Papers in Economics 07/14, University of Bergen, Department of Economics.
    19. Thierry Kangoye, 2008. "Instability from trade and democracy: the long-run effect of aid," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 6(41), pages 1-16.
    20. Dijkstra, Geske, 2018. "Aid and good governance: Examining aggregate unintended effects of aid," Evaluation and Program Planning, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 225-232.
    21. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:6:y:2008:i:41:p:1-16 is not listed on IDEAS
    22. Samuel Brazys & Krishna Chaitanya Vadlamannati, 2021. "Aid curse with Chinese characteristics? Chinese development flows and economic reforms," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 188(3), pages 407-430, September.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wly:reggov:v:13:y:2019:i:3:p:405-430. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://doi.org/10.1111/(ISSN)1748-5991 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.