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Agency proliferation and the globalization of the regulatory state: Introducing a data set on the institutional features of regulatory agencies

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  • Jacint Jordana
  • Xavier Fernández‐i‐Marín
  • Andrea C. Bianculli

Abstract

State structures have experienced significant transformation with the spread of globalization. This paper examines how to measure one major change that has occurred in recent decades: the worldwide proliferation of public agencies with regulatory tasks. It remains unclear how their configurations vary across countries and sectors, and what can be learned from these variations. To better identify these agencies worldwide, we introduce a new dataset on the institutional features of 799 agencies in 115 countries and 17 policy sectors. The dataset contains variables from their institutional profiles, covering a broad range of formal characteristics. To examine the diverse faces the regulatory state has adopted along its globalization path in depth, our variables are grouped into four blocs: regulatory responsibilities, managerial autonomy, political independence, and public accountability. As such, we depart from the view that a single dimension does capture the actual diversity of institutional forms regulatory agencies may exhibit. We also use factor and cluster analyses to assess their various forms, and suggest a typology of agency institutional models to facilitate more precise studies on the regulatory state. Results confirm that the regulatory state shows greater variety than usually expected.

Suggested Citation

  • Jacint Jordana & Xavier Fernández‐i‐Marín & Andrea C. Bianculli, 2018. "Agency proliferation and the globalization of the regulatory state: Introducing a data set on the institutional features of regulatory agencies," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 12(4), pages 524-540, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:reggov:v:12:y:2018:i:4:p:524-540
    DOI: 10.1111/rego.12189
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jacint Jordana & David Levi-Faur (ed.), 2004. "The Politics of Regulation," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 3167.
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    Cited by:

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    5. Federico M. Ferrara & Donato Masciandaro & Manuela Moschella & Davide Romelli, 2023. "What do politicians think of technocratic institutions? Experimental Evidence on the European Central Bank," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 23201, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    6. Voigt, Stefan, 2023. "Non-Majoritarian Institutions - A Menace to Constitutional Democracy?," ILE Working Paper Series 68, University of Hamburg, Institute of Law and Economics.
    7. Kumar, Shashwat, 2022. "Taking root: Independent Regulatory Agency model of regulation in Indian electricity sector," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 164(C).
    8. Maja Milas, 2022. "Perspectives on Independence of Quality Assurance Agencies in European Higher Education Context," Digital Transformation: The Harmonic Convergence of People, Culture, Process, and Technology in the New Normal,, ToKnowPress.
    9. Zürn, Michael, 2022. "How Non-Majoritarian Institutions Make Silent Majorities Vocal: A Political Explanation of Authoritarian Populism," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 20(3), pages 788-807.
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    11. González, Camilo Ignacio, 2022. "Can we have it all? The evolution of regulatory frameworks in Latin America," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).

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