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Two spheres of regulation: Balancing social and economic goals

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  • Sandra Eckert

Abstract

Independent regulatory authorities hold comprehensive policy mandates that cover both economic and social goals. They take on various roles in market regulation, competition policy, consumer protection, and labor inspection. This article questions whether policymakers are driven by different rationales when delegating the realization of social, as opposed to economic goals, and analyzes how regulators accommodate their various roles in practice. The conceptual framework links the literature on delegation and organizational models. Comparative analysis of postal policy in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom covers a serious area of potential conflict between social and economic regulation. Variation in delegation points to the relevance of instrumental considerations, but also to the politics of institutional arrangements. Variation in regulatory practice shows that organizational models make a difference in accommodating conflict. The article makes a strong case that social and economic regulation need to be addressed as two distinct, yet interacting spheres. © 2017 John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd

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  • Sandra Eckert, 2018. "Two spheres of regulation: Balancing social and economic goals," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 12(2), pages 177-191, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:reggov:v:12:y:2018:i:2:p:177-191
    DOI: 10.1111/rego.12137
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Yehuda Porath & Tal Sadeh, 2022. "National Debt Management Autonomy and National Debt Maturity at Issue," Bank of Israel Working Papers 2022.14, Bank of Israel.

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