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How can we better align private security with the public interest? Towards a civilizing model of regulation

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  • Ian Loader
  • Adam White

Abstract

How can we better align private security with the public interest? This question has met with two answers in the literature on private security regulation, one seeking to cleanse the market of deviant sellers, the other to communalize the market through the empowerment of buyers. Both models of regulation are premised upon a limited neoclassical economic conception of how market transactions map onto the public interest. This article makes the case for a new model of regulation, one that seeks to civilize the market. Drawing upon the insights of economic sociology, our model regards the market for security as a moral economy in which commodity and non‐commodity values jostle and collide. On this basis, we propose a regulatory architecture where buyers and sellers are cast not only as economic actors but also as moral actors, revealing new avenues through which to encompass private security within the democratic promise of security.

Suggested Citation

  • Ian Loader & Adam White, 2017. "How can we better align private security with the public interest? Towards a civilizing model of regulation," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 11(2), pages 166-184, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:reggov:v:11:y:2017:i:2:p:166-184
    DOI: 10.1111/rego.12109
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Black, Julia, 2002. "Critical reflections on regulation," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 35985, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    3. Satz, Debra, 2010. "Why Some Things Should Not Be for Sale: The Moral Limits of Markets," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195311594.
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