Experimenting with the transition rule in dynamic games
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
DOI: 10.3982/QE687
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Other versions of this item:
- Alistair Wilson, 2018. "Experimenting with the Transition Rule in Dynamic Games," Working Paper 6533, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Tobias Salz & Emanuel Vespa, 2020.
"Estimating dynamic games of oligopolistic competition: an experimental investigation,"
RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 51(2), pages 447-469, June.
- Tobias Salz & Emanuel Vespa, 2020. "Estimating Dynamic Games of Oligopolistic Competition: An Experimental Investigation," NBER Working Papers 26765, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Appelbaum, Elie & Katz, Eliakim, 2022. "Bonding by guilt: A resolution of the finite horizon prisoners’ dilemma," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 100(C).
- Ghidoni, Riccardo & Suetens, Sigrid, 2019.
"Empirical Evidence on Repeated Sequential Games,"
Other publications TiSEM
ff3a441f-e196-4e45-ba59-c, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Suetens, Sigrid & Ghidoni, Riccardo, 2019. "Empirical evidence on repeated sequential games," CEPR Discussion Papers 13809, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Ghidoni, Riccardo & Suetens, Sigrid, 2019. "Empirical Evidence on Repeated Sequential Games," Discussion Paper 2019-016, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Kartal, Melis & Müller, Wieland & Tremewan, James, 2021. "Building trust: The costs and benefits of gradualism," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 258-275.
- Emanuel Vespa & Taylor Weidman & Alistair J. Wilson, 2021.
"Testing Models of Strategic Uncertainty: Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games,"
Papers
2101.05900, arXiv.org.
- Boczoń, Marta & Vespa, Emanuel & Weidman, Taylor & Wilson, Alistair J, 2024. "Testing Models of Strategic Uncertainty: Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt7pk7c4gb, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
- Johannes Hoelzemann & Nicolas Klein, 2021.
"Bandits in the lab,"
Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(3), pages 1021-1051, July.
- HOELZEMANN, Johannes & KLEIN, Nicolas, 2018. "Bandits in the Lab," Cahiers de recherche 2018-09, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- Johannes HOELZEMANN & Nicolas KLEIN, 2018. "Bandits in the Lab," Cahiers de recherche 12-2018, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- Masaki Aoyagi & Guillaume Frechette & Sevgi Yuksel, 2021. "Beliefs in Repeated Games," ISER Discussion Paper 1119rr, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, revised May 2022.
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