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Regulation and private participation in the water and sanitation sector

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  • Judith A. Rees

Abstract

Private‐sector participation is widely perceived to be the solution to the failure of many publicly owned and managed water utilities to operate efficiently and make the investments required to meet community needs. However, there are no guarantees that privatisation will actually yield the desired performance improvements. Simply converting a public‐sector monopoly into a private one provides no competitive incentives for the utility to operate efficiently, make appropriate investments or respond to consumer demands. Likewise, privatisation per se need do little to improve sector performance if governments are unwilling or unable to tackle such underlying problems as overmanning, uneconomic water pricing policies, financing the provision of public and merit goods, and restricting over‐intrusive political intervention. Given the characteristics of the water and sanitation sector it is inevitable that some form of continued public regulation of the private companies will be necessary. The regulatory burden can be reduced by adopting a competitive form of privatisation, choosing a more competitive sector structure and devising an appropriate regulatory regime. However, it has to be recognised that there will be a trade‐off between making a venture attractive to private firms and introducing a notionally ‘ideal’ regulatory system. Regulation, in practice, is as much about creating the conditions under which private firms can operate effectively and efficiently as it is about protecting specific customer and public interests.

Suggested Citation

  • Judith A. Rees, 1998. "Regulation and private participation in the water and sanitation sector," Natural Resources Forum, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 22(2), pages 95-105, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:natres:v:22:y:1998:i:2:p:95-105
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1477-8947.1998.tb00717.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring.
    2. Emanuel Idelovitch & Klas Ringskog, 1995. "Private Sector Participation in Water Supply and Sanitation in Latin America," Reports _017, World Bank Latin America and the Caribean Region Department.
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    Cited by:

    1. Nick Johnstone & Libby Wood & Robert Hearne, 1999. "Private sector participation in urban water and sanitation: Realising social and environmental objectives in developing countries," Natural Resources Forum, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 23(4), pages 287-302, November.
    2. Yeti Nisha Madhoo, 2007. "International Trends In Water Utility Regimes," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 78(1), pages 87-135, March.
    3. Laila Smith & Susan Hanson, 2003. "Access to Water for the Urban Poor in Cape Town: Where Equity Meets Cost Recovery," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, vol. 40(8), pages 1517-1548, July.

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