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Contracting for management: Assessing management capacity under alternative service delivery arrangements

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  • Trevor Brown

    (The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio)

  • Matt Potoski

    (Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa)

Abstract

Contracting critics suggest that when governments outsource, they reduce their capacity to produce services and manage service delivery. In this paper, we decompose the service delivery decision into service production and service management components. When governments contract for service production, they may also choose to contract for a portion of service delivery management. Studies that only compare the management activities of contracting and direct service delivery governments, without examining the management activities contracted to vendors, are likely to be incomplete and biased. Drawing on a unique survey of governmental refuse collection service directors, matched with a survey of refuse collection vendors operating under municipal contracts, we show that the vendors' management activities offset the decline in management capacity that occurs when governments contract for service delivery for this particular service. Governments can “buy” management activities when contracting for service production. © 2006 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management

Suggested Citation

  • Trevor Brown & Matt Potoski, 2006. "Contracting for management: Assessing management capacity under alternative service delivery arrangements," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 25(2), pages 323-346.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:jpamgt:v:25:y:2006:i:2:p:323-346
    DOI: 10.1002/pam.20175
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Adam Eckerd & Amanda M. Girth, 2017. "Designing the Buyer–Supplier Contract for Risk Management: Assessing Complexity and Mission Criticality," Journal of Supply Chain Management, Institute for Supply Management, vol. 53(3), pages 60-75, July.
    2. Martijn van den Hurk & Marlies Hueskes, 2017. "Beyond the financial logic: Realizing valuable outcomes in public–private partnerships in Flanders and Ontario," Environment and Planning C, , vol. 35(5), pages 784-808, August.

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