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Bank Leverage Limits and Regulatory Arbitrage: Old Question‐New Evidence

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  • DONG BEOM CHOI
  • MICHAEL R. HOLCOMB
  • DONALD P. MORGAN

Abstract

Banks are regulated more than most firms, making them good subjects to study regulatory arbitrage (avoidance). Their latest arbitrage opportunity may be the new leverage rule covering the largest U.S. banks; leverage rules require equal capital against assets with unequal risks, so banks can effectively relax the leverage constraint by increasing asset risk. Consistent with that conjecture, we find that banks covered by the new rule shifted to riskier, higher yielding securities relative to control banks. The shift began almost precisely when the rule was finalized in 2014, well before it took effect in 2018. Security level analysis suggests banks actively added riskier securities, rather than merely shedding safer ones. Despite the risk shifting, overall bank risk did not increase, evidently because the banks most constrained by the new leverage rule significantly increased leverage capital ratios.

Suggested Citation

  • Dong Beom Choi & Michael R. Holcomb & Donald P. Morgan, 2020. "Bank Leverage Limits and Regulatory Arbitrage: Old Question‐New Evidence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 52(S1), pages 241-266, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:jmoncb:v:52:y:2020:i:s1:p:241-266
    DOI: 10.1111/jmcb.12742
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Anna Kovner & Peter Van Tassel, 2022. "Evaluating Regulatory Reform: Banks' Cost of Capital and Lending," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 54(5), pages 1313-1367, August.
    2. Roberts, Daniel & Sarkar, Asani & Shachar, Or, 2023. "Liquidity regulations, bank lending and fire-sale risk," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 156(C).
    3. Fatouh, Mahmoud & Giansante, Simone & Ongena, Steven, 2023. "Leverage ratio and risk-taking: theory and practice," Bank of England working papers 1048, Bank of England.
    4. Mahmoud Fatouh & Simone Giansante & Steven Ongena, 2024. "Leverage ratio, risk‐based capital requirements, and risk‐taking in the United Kingdom," Financial Markets, Institutions & Instruments, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 33(1), pages 31-60, February.

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