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Buying peace or fuelling war: the role of corruption in armed conflicts

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  • Philippe Le Billon

    (Liu Institute for Global Issues, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada)

Abstract

Although corruption may have a corrosive effect on economies and rule-based institutions, it also forms part of the fabric of social and political relationships. This endogenous character means that conflict may be engendered more by changes in the pattern of corruption than by the existence of corruption itself. Such changes, frequently associated with domestic or external shocks, can lead to armed conflict as increasingly violent forms of competitive corruption between factions 'fuel war' by rewarding belligerents. Controversially, 'buying-off' belligerents can facilitate a transition to peace; but 'sticks' such as economic sanctions, rather than 'carrots', have dominated international conflict resolution instruments. While 'buying peace' can present a short-term solution, the key challenge for peace-building initiatives and fiscal reforms is to shift individual incentives and rewards away from the competition for immediate corrupt gains. This may be facilitated by placing public revenues under international supervision during peace processes. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Suggested Citation

  • Philippe Le Billon, 2003. "Buying peace or fuelling war: the role of corruption in armed conflicts," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 15(4), pages 413-426.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:jintdv:v:15:y:2003:i:4:p:413-426
    DOI: 10.1002/jid.993
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. James A. Piazza, 2016. "Oil and terrorism: an investigation of mediators," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 169(3), pages 251-268, December.
    3. Audrey Rose Menard, 2014. "Do natural resources condition the aid-governance relationship? Evidence from Africa," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 34(2), pages 1317-1326.
    4. Lis, Piotr, 2018. "The impact of armed conflict and terrorism on foreign aid: A sector-level analysis," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 283-294.
    5. Kjetil Bjorvatn & Alireza Naghavi, 2010. "Rent Seekers in Rentier States: When Greed Brings Peace," Working Papers 2010.39, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    6. Julia M. Puaschunder & Dirk Beerbaum, 2020. "The Future of Healthcare around the World: Four indices integrating Technology, Productivity, Anti-Corruption, Healthcare and Market Financialization," Proceedings of the 18th International RAIS Conference, August 17-18, 2020 021jpmd, Research Association for Interdisciplinary Studies.
    7. Meierrieks, Daniel & Auer, Daniel, 2022. "Bribes and Bombs: The Effect of Corruption on Terrorism," VfS Annual Conference 2022 (Basel): Big Data in Economics 264084, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    8. Mohammad Reza Farzanegan & Stefan Witthuhn, 2014. "Demographic Transition and Political Stability: Does Corruption Matter?," CESifo Working Paper Series 5133, CESifo.
    9. Syropoulos, Constantinos & Zylkin, Thomas, 2015. "The Problem of Peace: A Story of Corruption, Destruction, and Rebellion," School of Economics Working Paper Series 2015-5, LeBow College of Business, Drexel University.
    10. Igor Abramov, 2009. "Building Peace in Fragile States – Building Trust is Essential for Effective Public–Private Partnerships," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 89(4), pages 481-494, March.
    11. Rettberg, Angelika, 2016. "Need, creed, and greed: Understanding why business leaders focus on issues of peace," Business Horizons, Elsevier, vol. 59(5), pages 481-492.
    12. Bjorvatn, Kjetil & Naghavi, Alireza, 2011. "Rent seeking and regime stability in rentier states," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 27(4), pages 740-748.
    13. John R. Hudson, 2011. "Conflict and Corruption," Chapters, in: Derek L. Braddon & Keith Hartley (ed.), Handbook on the Economics of Conflict, chapter 8, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    14. Philip Arena & Brian Hardt, 2014. "Incentives to Rebel, Bargaining, and Civil War," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 40(1), pages 127-141, January.
    15. James Boyce, 2007. "Public Finance, Aid and Post-Conflict Recovery," Working Papers wp140, Political Economy Research Institute, University of Massachusetts at Amherst.
    16. Camilla Orjuela & Dhammika Herath & Jonas Lindberg, 2016. "Corrupt Peace? Corruption and Ethnic Divides in Post-war Sri Lanka," Journal of South Asian Development, , vol. 11(2), pages 149-174, August.
    17. David M Malone & Heiko Nitzschke, 2010. "Economic Agendas in Civil Wars: What We Know, What We Need to Know," Working Papers id:3226, eSocialSciences.
    18. Horatiu Rus, 2014. "Corruption, conflict and the management of natural resources," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 15(4), pages 355-386, November.
    19. Julia M. Puaschunder, 2020. "The Future of Artificial Intelligence in International Healthcare: An Index," Proceedings of the 17th International RAIS Conference, June 1-2, 2020 003jp, Research Association for Interdisciplinary Studies.
    20. Felix Ettensperger, 2020. "Comparing supervised learning algorithms and artificial neural networks for conflict prediction: performance and applicability of deep learning in the field," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 54(2), pages 567-601, April.

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