IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/wly/jintdv/v13y2001i6p741-765.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Central Bank transformation in a globalized world: the Reserve Bank in post-apartheid South Africa

Author

Listed:
  • Vishnu Padayachee

    (School of Development Studies, University of Natal, Durban, South Africa)

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Vishnu Padayachee, 2001. "Central Bank transformation in a globalized world: the Reserve Bank in post-apartheid South Africa," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 13(6), pages 741-765.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:jintdv:v:13:y:2001:i:6:p:741-765
    DOI: 10.1002/jid.810
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/jid.810
    File Function: Link to full text; subscription required
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1002/jid.810?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Brian Snowdon & Howard R. Vane & Peter Wynarczyk, 1994. "A Modern Guide To Macroeconomics," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 450.
    2. Yelena Kalyuzhnova & George Tridimas, 1998. "Central banking in post-socialist economies: Introduction," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 10(5), pages 639-641.
    3. Sylvester Eijffinger (ed.), 1997. "Independent central banks and economic performance," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 1143.
    4. Guy Debelle & Stanley Fischer, 1994. "How independent should a central bank be?," Conference Series ; [Proceedings], Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, vol. 38, pages 195-225.
    5. Stanners, W, 1993. "Is Low Inflation an Important Condition for High Growth?," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Cambridge Political Economy Society, vol. 17(1), pages 79-107, March.
    6. Habib, Adam & Padayachee, Vishnu, 2000. "Economic Policy and Power Relations in South Africa's Transition to Democracy," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 245-263, February.
    7. Lionel Price, 1998. "The responsibilities of central banks in the transition economies," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 10(5), pages 643-657.
    8. Christopher Cramer, 2000. "Inequality, Development and Economic Correctness," Working Papers 105, Department of Economics, SOAS University of London, UK.
    9. Walsh, Carl E, 1995. "Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 150-167, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Leonce Ndikumana, 2008. "Can macroeconomic policy stimulate private investment in South Africa? New insights from aggregate and manufacturing sector-level evidence," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 20(7), pages 869-887.
    2. Lumengo Bonga-Bonga & Ntsakeseni Letitia Lebese, 2019. "Rethinking The Current Inflation Target Range In South Africa," Journal of Developing Areas, Tennessee State University, College of Business, vol. 53(2), pages 13-27, April-Jun.
    3. Mr. Christopher W. Crowe, 2006. "Goal-Independent Central Banks: Why Politicians Decide to Delegate," IMF Working Papers 2006/256, International Monetary Fund.
    4. Jannie Rossouw & Vishnu Padayachee, 2009. "Measuring Inflation Credibility: Results Of A First Representative South African Sample," South African Journal of Economics, Economic Society of South Africa, vol. 77(2), pages 314-331, June.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Ms. Francesca Castellani & Mr. Xavier Debrun, 2001. "Central Bank Independence and the Design of Fiscal Institutions," IMF Working Papers 2001/205, International Monetary Fund.
    2. Reiner Eichenberger & Sergio Rossi, 2004. "Die Deregulierung der Zentralbanken: Auf zu einem internationalen Markt für gute Geldpolitik!," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES), Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES), vol. 140(III), pages 327-353, September.
    3. Singleton,John, 2010. "Central Banking in the Twentieth Century," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521899093, September.
    4. Martin, Fernando M., 2015. "Debt, inflation and central bank independence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 129-150.
    5. Crowe, Christopher & Meade, Ellen E., 2008. "Central bank independence and transparency: Evolution and effectiveness," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 763-777, December.
    6. L. Lambertini & R. Rovelli, 2003. "Monetary and fiscal policy coordination and macroeconomic stabilization. A theoretical analysis," Working Papers 464, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
    7. McCallum, Bennett T., 1999. "Issues in the design of monetary policy rules," Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & M. Woodford (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 23, pages 1483-1530, Elsevier.
    8. Paul Levine & Joseph Pearlman, 2002. "Delegation and Fiscal Policy in the Open Economy: More Bad News for Rogoff's Delegation Game," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 153-174, April.
    9. Beetsma, Roel M. W. J. & Lans Bovenberg, A., 1998. "Monetary union without fiscal coordination may discipline policymakers," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 239-258, August.
    10. al-Nowaihi, Ali & Levine, Paul, 1998. "Can political monetary cycles be avoided?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 525-545, October.
    11. Masciandaro, Donato & Romelli, Davide, 2015. "Ups and downs of central bank independence from the Great Inflation to the Great Recession: theory, institutions and empirics," Financial History Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 22(3), pages 259-289, December.
    12. Ben S. Bernanke & Frederic S. Mishkin, 1997. "Inflation Targeting: A New Framework for Monetary Policy?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(2), pages 97-116, Spring.
    13. Avinash Dixit & Luisa Lambertini, 2003. "Interactions of Commitment and Discretion in Monetary and Fiscal Policies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(5), pages 1522-1542, December.
    14. Weymark, Diana N., 2007. "Inflation, government transfers, and optimal central bank independence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 297-315, February.
    15. Brian Snowdon & Howard R. Vane, 1999. "The New Political Macroeconomics: An Interview with Alberto Alesina," The American Economist, Sage Publications, vol. 43(1), pages 19-34, March.
    16. Haizhou Huang & A. Jorge Padilla, 2002. "Fiscal Policy and the Implementation of the Walsh Contract for Central Bankers," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 3(1), pages 27-42, May.
    17. Jean-François Segalotto & Mr. Marco Arnone & Mr. Bernard J Laurens, 2006. "Measures of Central Bank Autonomy: Empirical Evidence for OECD, Developing, and Emerging Market Economies," IMF Working Papers 2006/228, International Monetary Fund.
    18. Carl Walsh, 2015. "Goals and Rules in Central Bank Design," CESifo Working Paper Series 5293, CESifo.
    19. Kuttner, Kenneth N. & Posen, Adam S., 1999. "Does talk matter after all? Inflation targeting and central bank behavior," CFS Working Paper Series 1999/04, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
    20. Bryan Chapple, 2006. "Monetary policy strategies and credibility - theory and practice," DNB Occasional Studies 404, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wly:jintdv:v:13:y:2001:i:6:p:741-765. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/5102/home .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.