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Telecommunications reform in developing countries after the WTO agreement on basic telecommunications services

Author

Listed:
  • Peter Cowhey

    (Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, University of California, San Diego, La Jolla, USA)

  • Mikhail M. Klimenko

    (Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, University of California, San Diego, La Jolla, USA)

Abstract

This paper studies the main consequences and lessons of the WTO Agreement on Basic Telecommunications Services for economic reforms in developing countries. Our analysis emphasizes that the Agreement changed market and policy expectations about the supply, pricing, and demand growth of communications services. We show that WTO-enforced regulatory code in telecommunications (the 'Reference Paper') has considerably lowered the risks for domestic and foreign investors. One of the main conclusions of the paper is that an enforceable regulatory code can be an important tool for developing countries when reconciling the needs for policy consistency and flexibility during the introduction of competition in telecommunications. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Suggested Citation

  • Peter Cowhey & Mikhail M. Klimenko, 2000. "Telecommunications reform in developing countries after the WTO agreement on basic telecommunications services," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 12(2), pages 265-281.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:jintdv:v:12:y:2000:i:2:p:265-281
    DOI: 10.1002/(SICI)1099-1328(200003)12:2<265::AID-JID662>3.0.CO;2-7
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Cowhey, Peter F. & Richards, John E., 2002. "Deregulating and liberalizing the North-American telecommunications market: Explaining the US-approach," HWWA Discussion Papers 164, Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWA).
    2. Carlo Maria Rossotto & Khalid Sekkat & Aristomene Varoudakis, 2005. "Opening up telecommunications to competition and MENA integration in the world economy," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 17(7), pages 931-955.
    3. Eckebrecht, Felicitas R., 2019. "Fueling investments - The effect of the Agreement on Basic Telecommunications," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 43(4), pages 361-379.
    4. Cowhey, Peter F. & Richards, John E., 2002. "Deregulating and Liberalizing the North-American Telecommunications Market: Explaining the US-Approach," Discussion Paper Series 26378, Hamburg Institute of International Economics.

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