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Does lobbying of firms complement executive networks in determining executive compensation?

Author

Listed:
  • Monomita Nandy
  • Suman Lodh
  • Jin Wang
  • Jaskaran Kaur

Abstract

In this paper we predict and find that the lobbying activities of firms can complement executive networks in determining executive compensation. Firms of all sizes, after considering market competition as a governance mechanism, prefer to consider lobbying as a means of networking along with executive level networking to determine executive compensation. The empirical implication of the study provides guidance to scholars who should consider lobbying along with executive networks in determining executive compensation. The composite theoretical underpinning and the importance of information flow through lobbying activities of firms will be an important insight for policy makers involved in determining executive compensation.

Suggested Citation

  • Monomita Nandy & Suman Lodh & Jin Wang & Jaskaran Kaur, 2021. "Does lobbying of firms complement executive networks in determining executive compensation?," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 26(3), pages 4137-4162, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:ijfiec:v:26:y:2021:i:3:p:4137-4162
    DOI: 10.1002/ijfe.2008
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    1. Suman Lodh & Monomita Nandy & Jaskaran Kaur, 2023. "Influence of governance bundles and directors' social capital on cash holding in foreign cross‐listed firms," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 28(4), pages 4271-4298, October.

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