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Learning Matters: Reappraising Object Allocation Rules When Agents Strategically Investigate

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  • Patrick Harless
  • Vikram Manjunath

Abstract

Individuals form preferences through search, interviews, discussion, and investigation. In a stylized object allocation model, we characterize the equilibrium learning strategies induced by different allocation rules and trace their welfare consequences. Our analysis reveals that top trading cycles rules dominate serial priority rules under inequality†averse measures of social welfare.

Suggested Citation

  • Patrick Harless & Vikram Manjunath, 2018. "Learning Matters: Reappraising Object Allocation Rules When Agents Strategically Investigate," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 59(2), pages 557-592, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:iecrev:v:59:y:2018:i:2:p:557-592
    DOI: 10.1111/iere.12280
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    Cited by:

    1. Artemov, Georgy, 2021. "Assignment mechanisms: Common preferences and information acquisition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).
    2. Estelle Cantillon, 2017. "Broadening the market design approach to school choice," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 33(4), pages 613-634.
    3. Noda, Shunya, 2022. "Strategic experimentation with random serial dictatorship," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 115-125.
    4. SangMok Lee, 2022. "Preference Learning in School Choice Problems," Papers 2202.08366, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2023.
    5. Rustamdjan Hakimov & Dorothea Kübler & Siqi Pan, 2023. "Costly information acquisition in centralized matching markets," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(4), pages 1447-1490, November.

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