IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/wly/hlthec/v28y2019i3p339-349.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The effect of cancer diagnosis on switching health insurance in medicare

Author

Listed:
  • Brett Lissenden

Abstract

Because health insurance is intended to protect patients in the event of a health shock, it is important to evaluate health insurance policy in the context of patients who experience health shocks. I measure the effect of cancer diagnosis on health insurance switching in order to compare cancer patient's preferences among private and publicly administered Medicare. I estimate that a cancer diagnosis increases the probability a patient will leave a private Medicare plan, for the public plan, by 0.8% points (41%). Similarly, a cancer diagnosis decreases the probability a patient will leave the public Medicare plan, for a private plan, by 0.5% points (16%). The implication is that private Medicare plans are relatively less attractive to cancer patients than they are to noncancer patients.

Suggested Citation

  • Brett Lissenden, 2019. "The effect of cancer diagnosis on switching health insurance in medicare," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 28(3), pages 339-349, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:hlthec:v:28:y:2019:i:3:p:339-349
    DOI: 10.1002/hec.3843
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1002/hec.3843
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1002/hec.3843?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jason Brown & Mark Duggan & Ilyana Kuziemko & William Woolston, 2014. "How Does Risk Selection Respond to Risk Adjustment? New Evidence from the Medicare Advantage Program," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(10), pages 3335-3364, October.
    2. Amy Finkelstein & Erzo F. P. Luttmer & Matthew J. Notowidigdo, 2013. "What Good Is Wealth Without Health? The Effect Of Health On The Marginal Utility Of Consumption," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 11, pages 221-258, January.
    3. Jonathan Gruber & Robin McKnight, 2016. "Controlling Health Care Costs through Limited Network Insurance Plans: Evidence from Massachusetts State Employees," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 8(2), pages 219-250, May.
    4. Keith M. Marzilli Ericson, 2014. "Consumer Inertia and Firm Pricing in the Medicare Part D Prescription Drug Insurance Exchange," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 6(1), pages 38-64, February.
    5. Vilsa Curto & Liran Einav & Amy Finkelstein & Jonathan Levin & Jay Bhattacharya, 2019. "Health Care Spending and Utilization in Public and Private Medicare," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 11(2), pages 302-332, April.
    6. Atwood, Alicia & Lo Sasso, Anthony T., 2016. "The effect of narrow provider networks on health care use," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 86-98.
    7. Maria Polyakova, 2016. "Regulation of Insurance with Adverse Selection and Switching Costs: Evidence from Medicare Part D," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(3), pages 165-195, July.
    8. Benjamin R. Handel, 2013. "Adverse Selection and Inertia in Health Insurance Markets: When Nudging Hurts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(7), pages 2643-2682, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. A. A. Withagen-Koster & R. C. Kleef & F. Eijkenaar, 2020. "Incorporating self-reported health measures in risk equalization through constrained regression," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer;Deutsche Gesellschaft für Gesundheitsökonomie (DGGÖ), vol. 21(4), pages 513-528, June.
    2. Rebecca M. Myerson & Reginald D. Tucker‐Seeley & Dana P. Goldman & Darius N. Lakdawalla, 2020. "Does Medicare Coverage Improve Cancer Detection and Mortality Outcomes?," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 39(3), pages 577-604, June.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Martin Gaynor & Kate Ho & Robert J. Town, 2015. "The Industrial Organization of Health-Care Markets," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 53(2), pages 235-284, June.
    2. Jonathan Gruber, 2017. "Delivering Public Health Insurance through Private Plan Choice in the United States," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 31(4), pages 3-22, Fall.
    3. Drake, Coleman, 2019. "What are consumers willing to pay for a broad network health plan?: Evidence from covered California," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 63-77.
    4. Francesco Decarolis & Andrea Guglielmo & Clavin Luscombe, 2020. "Open enrollment periods and plan choices," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 29(7), pages 733-747, July.
    5. Nicholas Tilipman, 2022. "Employer Incentives and Distortions in Health Insurance Design: Implications for Welfare and Costs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 112(3), pages 998-1037, March.
    6. Dahl, Gordon B. & Forbes, Silke J., 2023. "Doctor switching costs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 221(C).
    7. Nathaniel Hendren & Camille Landais & Johannes Spinnewijn, 2021. "Choice in Insurance Markets: A Pigouvian Approach to Social Insurance Design," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 13(1), pages 457-486, August.
    8. Kurt Lavetti & Kosali Simon, 2018. "Strategic Formulary Design in Medicare Part D Plans," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 10(3), pages 154-192, August.
    9. Tomas Pedro Sanguinetti, 2019. "How Do Couples Choose Individual Insurance Plans? Evidence from Medicare Part D," 2019 Papers psa1760, Job Market Papers.
    10. Keith Marzilli Ericson & Philipp Kircher & Johannes Spinnewijn & Amanda Starc, 2021. "Inferring Risk Perceptions and Preferences Using Choice from Insurance Menus: Theory and Evidence," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 131(634), pages 713-744.
    11. Daniel W. Sacks & Khoa Vu & Tsan-Yao Huang & Pinar Karaca-Mandic, 2017. "How do insurance firms respond to financial risk sharing regulations? Evidence from the Affordable Care Act," NBER Working Papers 24129, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Naoki Aizawa & You Suk Kim, 2020. "Public and Private Provision of Information in Market-Based Public Programs: Evidence from Advertising in Health Insurance Marketplaces," NBER Working Papers 27695, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Richard Domurat & Isaac Menashe & Wesley Yin, 2019. "The Role of Behavioral Frictions in Health Insurance Marketplace Enrollment and Risk: Evidence from a Field Experiment," NBER Working Papers 26153, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    14. Brett Lissenden, 2017. "Three's a Crowd? The Effect of Insurer Participation on Premiums and Cost-Sharing Parameters in the Initial Years of the ACA Marketplaces," American Journal of Health Economics, MIT Press, vol. 3(4), pages 477-506, Fall.
    15. Kate Ho & Joseph Hogan & Fiona Scott Morton, 2017. "The impact of consumer inattention on insurer pricing in the Medicare Part D program," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 48(4), pages 877-905, December.
    16. Daniel P. Miller & Jungwon Yeo, 2019. "The Consequences of a Public Health Insurance Option: Evidence from Medicare Part D," American Journal of Health Economics, MIT Press, vol. 5(2), pages 191-226, Spring.
    17. Mark Shepard, 2016. "Hospital Network Competition and Adverse Selection: Evidence from the Massachusetts Health Insurance Exchange," NBER Working Papers 22600, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    18. Naoki Aizawa & You Suk Kim, 2015. "Advertising and Risk Selection in Health Insurance Markets," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2015-101, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    19. Nathan Kettlewell & Yuting Zhang, 2024. "Age penalties and take‐up of private health insurance," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 33(4), pages 636-651, April.
    20. Jason Abaluck & Mauricio Caceres Bravo & Peter Hull: & Amanda Starc, 2021. "Mortality Effects and Choice Across Private Health Insurance Plans," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 136(3), pages 1557-1610.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wly:hlthec:v:28:y:2019:i:3:p:339-349. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/jhome/5749 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.