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Auctions vs negotiations: a study of price differentials

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  • Egil Kjerstad

Abstract

Recent contributions in auction and bargaining theory suggest that a procurer should place more faith in the power of competition among alternative suppliers than in his or her own negotiating skill. Based on data from 216 contracts between procurers and suppliers of medical and surgical articles, we test whether auctions and bargaining result in significantly different prices. The main results are that auctions give ‘thicker’ markets compared with negotiations, as expected, but that auctions do not result in significantly lower prices compared with negotiations. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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  • Egil Kjerstad, 2005. "Auctions vs negotiations: a study of price differentials," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 14(12), pages 1239-1251, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:hlthec:v:14:y:2005:i:12:p:1239-1251
    DOI: 10.1002/hec.1004
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. G. Crea & A. Cavaliere & A. Cozzi, 2019. "Price discrimination in the Italian medical device industry: an empirical analysis," Economia Politica: Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics, Springer;Fondazione Edison, vol. 36(2), pages 571-608, July.
    2. Michal Kvasnicka & Rostislav Stanek & Ondrej Krcal, 2015. "Do Auctions Improve Public Procurement? Evidence from the Czech Republic," DANUBE: Law and Economics Review, European Association Comenius - EACO, issue 4, pages 241-257, December.
    3. Woonghee Tim Huh & Kun Soo Park, 2010. "A sequential auction‐bargaining procurement model," Naval Research Logistics (NRL), John Wiley & Sons, vol. 57(1), pages 13-32, February.
    4. Koen V. Hindriks & Dmytro Tykhonov & Mathijs M. Weerdt, 2012. "Qualitative One-to-Many Multi-Issue Negotiation: Approximating the QVA," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 21(1), pages 49-77, January.
    5. Antal-Pomázi, Krisztina, 2012. "Public Procurement as Auction – Theoretical Models and Practical Problems," Public Finance Quarterly, Corvinus University of Budapest, vol. 57(4), pages 381-393.

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