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Political Influence and Career Judges: An Empirical Analysis of Administrative Review by the Spanish Supreme Court

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  • Nuno Garoupa
  • Marian Gili
  • Fernando Gómez‐Pomar

Abstract

This article develops an empirical analysis of judicial behavior in the Spanish Supreme Court, a court of law dominated by career judiciary. We focus on administrative review. The evidence seems to confirm that a career judiciary is not strongly politically aligned and favors consensus, formalism, and dissent avoidance. Notwithstanding, we detect a significant relationship between the decisions of the Court and the interest of the government. We suggest that our empirical analysis makes a significant contribution to undermine the myth of political insulation by career judges. Unlike previous literature, however, we argue and illustrate that judicial politicization can be consistent with consensus and dissent avoidance.

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  • Nuno Garoupa & Marian Gili & Fernando Gómez‐Pomar, 2012. "Political Influence and Career Judges: An Empirical Analysis of Administrative Review by the Spanish Supreme Court," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 9(4), pages 795-826, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:empleg:v:9:y:2012:i:4:p:795-826
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1740-1461.2012.01270.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Pablo T. Spiller & Rafael Gely, 2007. "Strategic Judicial Decision Making," NBER Working Papers 13321, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Albert Breton & Angela Fraschini, 2003. "The Independence of the Italian Constitutional Court," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 319-333, December.
    3. Sofia Amaral-Garcia & Nuno Garoupa & Veronica Grembi, 2009. "Judicial Independence and Party Politics in Constitutional Courts: The Case of Portugal," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/301515, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    4. Iaryczower, Matias & Spiller, Pablo T. & Tommasi, Mariano, 2006. "Judicial Lobbying: The Politics of Labor Law Constitutional Interpretation," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 100(1), pages 85-97, February.
    5. Sofia Amaral‐Garcia & Nuno Garoupa & Veronica Grembi, 2009. "Judicial Independence and Party Politics in the Kelsenian Constitutional Courts: The Case of Portugal," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 6(2), pages 381-404, June.
    6. Brian Goff, 2006. "Supreme Court consensus and dissent: Estimating the role of the selection screen," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 127(3), pages 367-383, June.
    7. Charles M. Cameron, 2007. "Bargaining and Opinion Assignment on the US Supreme Court," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 23(2), pages 276-302, June.
    8. Raphaël Franck, 2010. "Judicial Independence and the Validity of Controverted Elections," American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, vol. 12(2), pages 394-422.
    9. Escresa Laarni & Garoupa Nuno, 2012. "Judicial Politics in Unstable Democracies: The Case of the Philippine Supreme Court, An Empirical Analysis 1986-2010," Asian Journal of Law and Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 1-39, April.
    10. Segal, Jeffrey A. & Cover, Albert D., 1989. "Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 83(2), pages 557-565, June.
    11. Russell Smyth & Paresh Kumar Narayan, 2004. "Hail to the Chief! Leadership and Structural Change in the Level of Consensus on the High Court of Australia," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 1(2), pages 399-427, July.
    12. Gely, Rafael & Spiller, Pablo T, 1990. "A Rational Choice Theory of Supreme Court Statutory Decisions with Applications to the State Farm and Grove City Cases," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(2), pages 263-300, Fall.
    13. Raphaël Franck, 2009. "Judicial Independence Under a Divided Polity: A Study of the Rulings of the French Constitutional Court, 1959--2006," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 25(1), pages 262-284, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Bertoli, Paola & Garcia, Adriana G. & Garoupa, Nuno, 2022. "Testing an application of the political insurance model: The case of the Mexican state-level administrative courts," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 195(C), pages 272-287.
    2. Nuno Garoupa & Fernando Gómez Pomar & Adrián Segura & Sheila Canudas, 2023. "Punishing terrorists in the Spanish Supreme Court: has ideology played any role?," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 56(1), pages 1-21, August.
    3. Amaral-Garcia Sofia & Garoupa Nuno, 2017. "Judicial Behavior and Devolution at the Privy Council," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 13(3), pages 1-40, November.
    4. Virginia Rosales & Dolores Jiménez-Rubio, 2017. "Empirical analysis of civil litigation determinants: The Case of Spain," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 44(2), pages 321-338, October.
    5. Sofia Amaral-Garcia, 2015. "Non-economic Damages in Medical Malpractice Appeals: Does the Jurisdiction Make a Difference?," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1506, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    6. Keren Weinshall & Udi Sommer & Ya'acov Ritov, 2018. "Ideological influences on governance and regulation: The comparative case of supreme courts," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 12(3), pages 334-352, September.
    7. Freyens, Benoit Pierre & Gong, Xiaodong, 2020. "Judicial arbitration of unfair dismissal cases: The role of peer effects," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).
    8. Sofia Amaral-Garcia, 2019. "Medical Malpractice Appeals in a Civil Law System: Do Administrative and Civil Courts Award Non-Economic Damages Differently?," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/301273, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    9. Nuno Garoupa & Laura Salamero-Teixidó & Adrián Segura, 2022. "Disagreeing in private or dissenting in public: an empirical exploration of possible motivations," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 53(2), pages 147-173, April.

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