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Do the Claims Hold Up? A Study of Medical Negligence Claims Against Neurologists

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  • Lee D. Cranberg
  • Thomas H. Glick
  • Luke Sato

Abstract

We performed an in‐depth review of each of the 42 closed medical malpractice claims filed in the past 20 years against neurologist defendants covered by a common insurer. For each case, we determined whether the neurologist had rendered harmful, substandard care and noted the case outcome. In 23 of 42 claims (55 percent), there had been no harmful negligence, and payment on behalf of the neurologist occurred only once. The other 19 claims had negligent harm, but in 13 of them (68 percent) no payment was made on behalf of the negligent neurologist. In our series, the medical negligence system performed poorly, yielding a majority of inappropriate claims and no payment in a majority of appropriate claims.

Suggested Citation

  • Lee D. Cranberg & Thomas H. Glick & Luke Sato, 2007. "Do the Claims Hold Up? A Study of Medical Negligence Claims Against Neurologists," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 4(1), pages 155-162, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:empleg:v:4:y:2007:i:1:p:155-162
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1740-1461.2007.00085.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Henry S. Farber & Michelle J. White, 1991. "Medical Malpractice: An Empirical Examination of the Litigation Process," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(2), pages 199-217, Summer.
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