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Judicial Retirements and the Staying Power of U.S. Supreme Court Decisions

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  • Stuart Minor Benjamin
  • Georg Vanberg

Abstract

The influence of U.S. Supreme Court majority opinions depends critically on how these opinions are received and treated by lower courts, which decide the vast majority of legal disputes. We argue that the retirement of justices on the Supreme Court serves as a simple heuristic device for lower court judges in deciding how much deference to show to Supreme Court precedent. Using a unique data set of the treatment of all Supreme Court majority opinions in the courts of appeals from 1953 to 2012, we find that negative treatments of Supreme Court opinions increase, and positive treatments decrease, as the justices who supported a decision retire from the Court. Importantly, this effect exists over and above the impact of retirements on the ideological makeup of the Supreme Court.

Suggested Citation

  • Stuart Minor Benjamin & Georg Vanberg, 2016. "Judicial Retirements and the Staying Power of U.S. Supreme Court Decisions," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 13(1), pages 5-26, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:empleg:v:13:y:2016:i:1:p:5-26
    DOI: 10.1111/jels.12095
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Miceli, Thomas J. & Cosgel, Metin M., 1994. "Reputation and judicial decision-making," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 31-51, January.
    2. Martin, Andrew D. & Quinn, Kevin M., 2002. "Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953–1999," Political Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 10(2), pages 134-153, April.
    3. Charles R. Shipan & Megan L. Shannon, 2003. "Delaying Justice(s): A Duration Analysis of Supreme Court Confirmations," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 47(4), pages 654-668, October.
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