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Delaying Justice(s): A Duration Analysis of Supreme Court Confirmations

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  • Charles R. Shipan
  • Megan L. Shannon

Abstract

Presidents traditionally have had great success when nominating justices to the Supreme Court, with confirmation being the norm and rejection being the rare exception. While the confirmation process usually ends with the nominee taking a seat on the Court, however, there is a great deal of variance in the amount of time it takes the Senate to act. To derive a theoretical explanation of this underlying dynamic in the confirmation process, we draw on a spatial model of presidential nominations to the Court. We then employ a hazard model to test this explanation, using data on all Supreme Court nominations and confirmations since the end of the Civil War. Our primary finding is that the duration of the confirmation process increases as the ideological distance between the president and the Senate increases. We also find evidence that suggests that the duration increases for critical nominees and chief justices and decreases for older nominees, current and previous senators, and nominees with prior experience on state and federal district courts.

Suggested Citation

  • Charles R. Shipan & Megan L. Shannon, 2003. "Delaying Justice(s): A Duration Analysis of Supreme Court Confirmations," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 47(4), pages 654-668, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:amposc:v:47:y:2003:i:4:p:654-668
    DOI: 10.1111/1540-5907.00046
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    Cited by:

    1. Charles R. Shipan, 2008. "Partisanship, Ideology, and Senate Voting on Supreme Court Nominees," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 5(1), pages 55-76, March.
    2. Maya Sen & William Spaniel, 2017. "How uncertainty about judicial nominees can distort the confirmation process," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 29(1), pages 22-47, January.
    3. Stuart Minor Benjamin & Georg Vanberg, 2016. "Judicial Retirements and the Staying Power of U.S. Supreme Court Decisions," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 13(1), pages 5-26, March.
    4. Jinhee Jo, 2017. "Now or later? A dynamic analysis of judicial appointments," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 29(1), pages 149-164, January.

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