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A Note on Comparative Ambiguity Aversion and Justifiability

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  • P. Battigalli
  • S. Cerreia‐Vioglio
  • F. Maccheroni
  • M. Marinacci

Abstract

We consider a decision maker who ranks actions according to the smooth ambiguity criterion of Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005). An action is justifiable if it is a best reply to some belief over probabilistic models. We show that higher ambiguity aversion expands the set of justifiable actions. A similar result holds for risk aversion. Our results follow from a generalization of the duality lemma of Wald (1949) and Pearce (1984).

Suggested Citation

  • P. Battigalli & S. Cerreia‐Vioglio & F. Maccheroni & M. Marinacci, 2016. "A Note on Comparative Ambiguity Aversion and Justifiability," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 84, pages 1903-1916, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:emetrp:v:84:y:2016:i::p:1903-1916
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1991. "Adaptive and sophisticated learning in normal form games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 82-100, February.
    2. Peter Klibanoff & Massimo Marinacci & Sujoy Mukerji, 2005. "A Smooth Model of Decision Making under Ambiguity," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(6), pages 1849-1892, November.
    3. Pearce, David G, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1029-1050, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Burkhard C. Schipper, 2021. "The evolutionary stability of optimism, pessimism, and complete ignorance," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 90(3), pages 417-454, May.
    2. Christoph Bühren & Fabian Meier & Marco Pleßner, 2023. "Ambiguity aversion: bibliometric analysis and literature review of the last 60 years," Management Review Quarterly, Springer, vol. 73(2), pages 495-525, June.
    3. Battigalli, P. & Catonini, E. & Lanzani, G. & Marinacci, M., 2019. "Ambiguity attitudes and self-confirming equilibrium in sequential games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 1-29.
    4. Calford, Evan M., 2020. "Uncertainty aversion in game theory: Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 720-734.
    5. Calford, Evan M., 2021. "Mixed strategies and preference for randomization in games with ambiguity averse agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 197(C).
    6. Mark J. Schervish & Teddy Seidenfeld & Rafael B. Stern & Joseph B. Kadane, 2020. "What finite-additivity can add to decision theory," Statistical Methods & Applications, Springer;Società Italiana di Statistica, vol. 29(2), pages 237-263, June.
    7. Dominiak, Adam & Eichberger, Jürgen, 2021. "Games in context: Equilibrium under ambiguity for belief functions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 125-159.
    8. Michael Greinecker & Christoph Kuzmics, 2022. "Limit Orders and Knightian Uncertainty," Papers 2208.10804, arXiv.org.
    9. Guarino, Pierfrancesco & Ziegler, Gabriel, 2022. "Optimism and pessimism in strategic interactions under ignorance," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 559-585.
    10. Marilyn Pease & Mark Whitmeyer, 2023. "Safety, in Numbers," Papers 2310.17517, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2024.
    11. Kuzmics, Christoph, 2017. "Abraham Wald's complete class theorem and Knightian uncertainty," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 666-673.

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