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Knightian Analysis of the Vickrey Mechanism

Author

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  • Alessandro Chiesa
  • Silvio Micali
  • Zeyuan Allen Zhu

Abstract

We analyze the Vickrey mechanism for auctions of multiple identical goods when the players have both Knightian uncertainty over their own valuations and incomplete preferences. In this model, the Vickrey mechanism is no longer dominant‐strategy, and we prove that all dominant‐strategy mechanisms are inadequate. However, we also prove that, in undominated strategies, the social welfare produced by the Vickrey mechanism in the worst case is not only very good, but also essentially optimal.

Suggested Citation

  • Alessandro Chiesa & Silvio Micali & Zeyuan Allen Zhu, 2015. "Knightian Analysis of the Vickrey Mechanism," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 83(5), pages 1727-1754, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:emetrp:v:83:y:2015:i:5:p:1727-1754
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    Cited by:

    1. Gretschko, Vitali & Mass, Helene, 2024. "Worst-case equilibria in first-price auctions," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 19(1), January.
    2. Gerasimou, Georgios, 2018. "On the indifference relation in Bewley preferences," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 164(C), pages 24-26.
    3. Lopomo, Giuseppe & Rigotti, Luca & Shannon, Chris, 2022. "Uncertainty and robustness of surplus extraction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 199(C).
    4. Çağıl Koçyiğit & Garud Iyengar & Daniel Kuhn & Wolfram Wiesemann, 2020. "Distributionally Robust Mechanism Design," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(1), pages 159-189, January.
    5. Shafer, Rachel C., 2020. "Minimax regret and failure to converge to efficiency in large markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 281-287.
    6. Amine Allouah & Omar Besbes, 2020. "Prior-Independent Optimal Auctions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(10), pages 4417-4432, October.
    7. Gerasimou, Georgios, 2018. "On the indifference relation in Bewley preferences," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 164(C), pages 24-26.

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